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PREFACE
Throughout this dissertation, translations of
Aristotle are, unless indicated otherwise, my own. I
must acknowledge
,
however, that in translating, 1 have
always taken account of the translations of E. S.
Forster and W. A. Pickara-Cambridge
.
I have also benefited from the study of trans-
lations of selected passages by S. L. Peterson.
VAristotle on Paradoxes of Accidence
(September, 1974)
Anthony Willing, 3. A., Northwestern College,
M.A., University of Minnesota
Directed by: Dr. Gareth B. Matthews
In his treatment of the fallacy of "accidence"
("trcxpcx -c6 xoj" ) in De Sophisticis Elenchis
,
Aris-
totle discusses a well-known epistemic paradox which I call
"the Ccriscus Puzzle." In Chapter I, I present and examine
two recent interpretations of Aristotle's solution to that
paradox. I call one of these "the indiscernibility inter-
pretation"; the other I call "the substitutivity interpre-
tation." I argue that there are serious objections to each.
The task, then. Is to present a more adequate account.
According to Aristotle, the Coriscus Puzzle is to
be dealt with in the same way as the other sophisms listed
under the heading, 'paradoxes of accidence'. It is clear,
then, that an adequate interpretation of Aristotle's
solution to the Coriscus Puzzle must be such that it can,
with some degree of plausibility, be extended to those
other examples . With this in mind, preparatory to examining
Aristotle's remarks on solving paradoxes of accidence, I
attempt in Chapter II a first reconstruction of each of
these sophisms for which he—Aristotle— thinks one and one
vi
same solution suffices.
In Chapter III, I try to formulate and explicate
the fallacious principle that Aristotle seems to think is
operative in the various paradoxes of accidence. I call
this principle "the principle of accidence." My discussion
of the principle of accidence involves, among other things,
an attempt to clarify Aristotle’s use of ’ o-vj^eys^KcU’
(’accident') in this context.
Keeping in mind the groundwork laid in the pre-
vious chapter, I return, in Chapter IV, to the Coriscus
Puzzle. There I present, in some detail, my own account
of Aristotle's solution to that paradox. This involves,
of course, among other things, showing how Aristotle might
have come to think of the Coriscus Puzzle as arising from
an appeal to the fallacious principle of accidence. How-
ever, a number of other interesting features of the solu-
tion are also explored.
Finally, in Chapter V, I take up the remaining
paradoxes of accidence (laid out in Chapter II) to show
how, given my interpretation of Aristotle's solution to
the Coriscus Puzzle, the basic strategy of that solution
might understandably have been thought to be applicable to
those cases as well.
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1CHAPTER I
THE- CORISCUS PUZZLE: A PERENNIAL PARADOX
Introduction to the Puzzle
In De Sophisticis Elenchis XXIV Aristotle addresses
himself to a puzzle which is still a topic of controversy .
1
The puzzle is this. It is conceivable that the following
sentences might all be true at once:
(1) You know Coriscus
(2) You do not knew the one approaching
(3) Coriscus is the one approaching.
But, supposing that (1) (2) and (3) are true, one might go
on to draw the following conclusion:
(4) You know and you do not know the same thing.
The inference from (1) (2) and (3) to (4) may seem some-
what plausible. However, (4) is a contradiction. Sc, since
(1) (2) and (3) are assumed true, but (4) is false— in fact,
necessarily false—the inference from (1) (2) and (3) to (4)
must, despite appearances, be invalid. I shall call this
paradox "the Coriscus Puzzle."
Nowhere does Aristotle lay out the above sophism
in full. In fact, in his first mention of the argument he
refers to it simply as the "Do you know the one approach-
ing?" However, at .179b3~4 we are given a fairly clear
indication that the "Do you know the one approaching?
lProm hereon, ' De Sophlsticis Elenchis
1 will sometimes
be abbreviated as ' SE '
.
2does run as proposed in the previous paragraph. "it is
not the case , " says Aristotle, "that if I know Coriscus
but do not know the one approaching, then I know and do
not know the same thing." The inference under discussion
here seems plainly to be that from (1) (2) and (presumably,
although it is not explicitly stated here) (3) to (4).
The Coriscus Puzzle has a long history. The fact
that Aristotle takes no great pains to spell out the
paradox in detail suggests, perhaps
,
that it was a well-
established example of the time. This is confirmed to
some extent by Diogenes Laertius who ascribes the argu-
ment "The Veiled Figure"
—
presumably a version of the Coris-
cus argument--to Eubulides the Megarian, a contemporary of
Aristotle’s. Since then, one finds arguments signifi-
cantly like the Coriscus argument discussed by the Stoic,
Lucian, 3 and, in mediaeval times, by William of Sherwood, **
^Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosoohers
,
II, 108.
^The "Veiled Figure" is, as is noted by C . L.
Hamblin in Fallacies (London: Methuen and Co., 1970),
p. 90, stated in Lucian’s Philosophies For Sale :
Chrysippus
:
Buyer:
Chyrsippus
Buyer:
Chrysippus
. . . do you know your own father?
Yes
.
But if I put a veiled figure before you
and asked you if you knew him, what will
you say?
That I don’t, of course.
But the veiled figure turns out to be
your own father; so if you don’t know
him, you evidently don’t know your own
father.
^William of Sherwood, Introduction to Logic , tr. with
introduction and notes by Norman Kretzmann (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1966), pp. 152-153*
3Pseudo-Scotus ,5 and Buridan,6 among others. Finally, the
Coriscus Puzzle has found its way into contemporary
literature on epistemic logic—e.g. Roderick M. Chisholm's
"The Logic of Knowing" (a review of Jaakko Hintikka's
Knowledge and Belief ) .
7
But my concern with the Coriscus Puzzle is not to
trace its history; nor is it primarily to compare and
evaluate various solutions to the puzzle. Rather, I want
to try to get clear on Aristotle's own solution. That, in
itself, as will be seen, is a considerable undertaking.
A number of attempts have been made to spell out
Aristotle's solution to the Coriscus Puzzle. Some of
these interpretations, however, are clearly unsatisfactory
and have, I believe, been adequately dealt with by others. 0
But recently two more interesting interpretations have been
offered. Their special interest lies in the fact that they
raise important issues that have considerable currence in
5john Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Elenchorum ,
Vol . 2, Opera Omnia , (Paris! Vives , 1891 ) , esp. Quns . XL/i-
XLVIII
.
6John Buridan, Sophisms on Meaning and Truth , tr.
with introduction by Theodore Kermit Scott (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crof t s , 1966), pp . 124 , 126 , 133-134 .
7Roderick M. Chisholm, "The Logic of Knowing,
The Journal of Philosophy, LX, No. 25 (1963)? 790ff.
8ln particular, see
Paradox, (unpublished Ph.D.
1969), pp . 18-28. But see
pp. 84 - 87 , 207 - 208 .
S. L. Peterson, The Masker
dissertation, Princeton,
also C. L. Hamblin, Fallacies 5
4contemporary philosophical literature. In the remainder
of this chapter, then, I want to discuss each of these
interpretations. My opinion is that while each is pro-
vocative and perhaps may seem, initially, to be somewhat
plausible, neither is ultimately satisfactory as an account
of Aristotle’s own solution.
The Indiscernibility Interpretation
In a recent paper entitled "Aristotle on Sameness
and Oneness," Nicholas P. White presents a number of
interesting theses concerning Aristotle's dealings with
identity. 9 Of special interest here, however, is the claim
that between Topics and De Sophistic is Elenchis there is a
shift in Aristotle's position on identity. 10
White maintains--correctly
,
I think—that at Topics
152b25-29 Aristotle endorses a principle which he--White
—
calls "Leibniz' Law" or "LL." According to White, this
principle can be "loosely expressed" as
(PI) If A and B are identical, then whatever is
true of the one is true of the other. 11
But how, more precisely, is (PI) to be understood?
It seems reasonable to assume that the consequent
of (Pl) viz. 'Whatever is true of the one is true of the
9Hicholas P. White, "Aristotle on Sameness and One-
ness," The Philosophical Review , LXXX, No. 2 (1971), 177-197,
10 Ibid.
,
esp. pp. 178-182.
11 Ibid
,
pp. 178-179.
5other'—may be restated as 'for any attribute, F, A has F
if and only if B has F 5 . But, in that case, since ’A’
and ’B 1 in (PI) are presumably variables, we might
reformulate (PI) as
(P2) (x) (y ) (if x = y then (F)(x has F if and only
if y has F ) )
.
And (P2) is what is commonly referred to as "the principle
of the indiscernibility of identicals." Thus, when White
says that Aristotle, in Topics
,
endorses LL, I take him to
be saying, alternatively, that Aristotle there endorses
the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals—i.e.
(P2)
,
12
However--to continue with White's point—although
Aristotle endorsed LL in Topics
,
he soon found that this
principle led to paradoxes. The Coriscus Puzzle, is one
such paradox. So, according to White, in De Sophisticis
Elenchis we find Aristotle trying to resolve the Coriscus
Puzzle by abandoning the unrestricted form of LL. White
puts the point concisely:
12t personally, prefer to call (P2) "the principle
of the indiscernibility of identicals" rather than Leibniz
Law." In the first place, as observed by Fred Feldman in
"Leibniz and 'Leibniz' Law'," The Philosophical
LXXIX
,
No. 4 (1970), p. 510, the name 'Leibniz' Law' is used
by many philosophers to refer to the principle
(x)(y)(x = y if and only if (F)(Fx if and only if Fy ) )
,
instead of simply (P2). And, in addition to this, it seems
not really appropriate to call (P2) "Leibniz' Law, since
again, as Feldman has convincingly argued—there is little
to suggest that Leibniz himself endorsed either that
pr^n
ciple
,
or, a fortiori , the biconditional stated above.
6As Aristotle sees it, the problem is that one and the
same thing would seem both to have and to lack the
attribute of being known by me. For this reason, he
gives in and puts a new sort of restriction on LL.
He retreats from saying without qualification that if
A and B are the same, then whatever is true of the
one is true of the other. Rather, he maintains (to
use his manner of putting it) that the same things
belong only to things which are without difference
and one in substance. 13
The strategy here seem clear. First, on this inter-
pretation of Aristotle's treatment of the Coriscus Puzzle,
Aristotle is assumed to have thought that the inference
from
(1) You know Coriscus
(2) You do not know the one approaching
(3) Coriscus is the one approaching
(4)
You know and you do not know the same thing
depends, at least in part, on LL. And indeed this would be
quite reasonable. For if we take ’You do not know' in (2)
to express an attribute of Coriscus, and (3) to be assert-
ing that Coriscus and the one approaching are identical,
then the argument might be laid out more explicitly in the
following way:
(Read ' c ' as '
’Kx' as 'x has
and ' ~Kx ' as '
by you'
.
)
(1) Kc
(2) ~Ka
(3) c = a
(4) ~Kc
(5) Kc • ~Kc
(6) (3x ) (Kx *
'the one approaching’
being known by you’,
' Coriscus
'
,
’
a
'
as
the attribute of
x has the attribute of being not known
( Premiss
)
( Premiss
( Premiss
((2), (3)
((1), (*D
and LL - i .
e
Conjunction)
( P2 )
)
Kx) ((5), Existential Generalization)
^white, op.cit.. p. 179.
7LL comes in, then, in the move from (2) and (3) to (4). 14
Second, however. White's interpretation has Aris-
totle solving the paradox by simply giving up the unre-
stricted version of LL—i.e. (P2)—in favor of a restricted
version—viz
.
(P3) (x)(y)(if x - y and x and y are one substance
then (F ) (x has F if and only if y has F)).
Now, the reasoning goes, although (4) follows from (2) and
(3) by ( P2 )
,
it does not follow by (P3). To derive (4)
using (P3) we need, in addition to (2) and (3), the premiss
'c and a are one in substance'. But if (4) no longer
follows then neither do (5) and (6). And, in that case,
the paradox disappears.
* * *
White's interpretation—or as I label it in the
heading of this section, "the indiscernibility interpreta-
tion"—seems, at first glance, very neat. Yet I am not
convinced that this account of the De Sophisticis Elenchis
passage does justice to Aristotle. In fact, there are
several considerations that seem to me to suggest that we
^Actually, given White's formulation of LL, the
justification for the inference from (2) and (3) to (4) re-
quires appeal to additional logical rules—e.g. a universal
instantiation rule (applied twice), and modus ponens (applied
twice). But the move could, of course, be made directly, if
'LL' were taken to refer to the rule of inference,
If ro< =/3 1 is true, then, if is true, then it is
permissible to infer that r0/3_1 is true, and, if
is true, then it is permissible to infer that is true.
8would do well to look for an alternative to White’s sug-
gestion. Let me present what I take to be some of the
more important of these.
First, let us examine more closely the so-called
"shift" in Aristotle’s position on identity that White
claims to find between Topics and De Sophistlcis Elenchis .
On White's interpretation, it seems that Aristotle is
supposed to have given up the principle
(P2) (x)(y)(if x = y then (F)(x has F if and only if
y has F))
in favor of the principle
(P3) (x)(y)(if x = y and x and y are one in substance
then (F)(x has F if and only if y has F)).
( P 3
)
is alleged to be a restricted version of (P2).
But one wonders just what that restriction amounts to.
More specifically, how does what is expressed by 'x = y and
x and y are one in substance' differ from what is expressed
by 'x = y’? Is it not the case that if x and y are identi-
cal, then it follows that x and y are "one in substance"?
Or, to put it another way, are we to suppose that x and y
might be identical although they are different in sub-
stance? White gives us no help on this.
The second objection to White's interpretation of
of Aristotle's solution to the Coriscus Puzzle also concerns
the so-called "restricted version of LL." White claims to
find this principle in the following quotation from De
Sophist icis Elenchis 179a38-bl: "^ovo^ ykp to?^
9f 3 0 / Ne/*?
TTj\J OUCT(«V o(Otc< ^0|00tj K<*(. OV OUCT(V #1T0<VTU SoKzl TfliutA urr«p^£.{v"
(call this quotation "Q"). But, on closer examination,
one wonders what could have led White to regard this
statement
—
Q—as a formulation of something like the re-
stricted LL.
It seems that a plausible translation of Q should
go something like this: "For only to things that are in-
distinguishable and one in substance is it generally
agreed that all the same attributes belong. "15 That is,
Aristotle's principle here appears to be
(P4) Only things that are indistinguishable and one
substance have all their attributes in common.
But (P4) hardly says the same as (P3). Rather, it seems
to be more accurately rendered by
(P5) (x)(y)(if (F)(x has F is and only if
-y has F),
then x = y and x and y are one in substance).
And (P5) is the converse of (P3).
In view of this, one might suppose that, since
White purports to find something like (P3) in Q, he simply
has in mind a different translation of Q from the one sug-
gested. More specifically, one would expect that he re-
jects the suggestion that the principle expressed in Q is
( pi* ) . Perhaps—one might conjecture—White thinks that Q
should be translated In something like the following way:
"The only things that are indistinguishable and one in
15l’he translation is Pickard-Cambridge ' s . The
translations of Forster and Poste agree in essentials.
10
substance (are things that) have all their attributes in
common.” Then (P3), as opposed to (P5), would be the more
accurate rendering.
But, in fact. White himself rules out this possi-
bility. For his own paraphrase of Q runs as follows:
• • • the sarae things belong only to things which are
without difference and one in substance.”^ And this
reading supports the view that in this passage Aristotle
intends something more like (P5) than (P3).
In summary, then, the objection to be made here is
that it is simply not clear why White wants to insist that
in asserting Q Aristotle was advocating a restricted version
of Leibniz' Law— i.e. (P2). In fact. White seems to have
misunderstood the logical form of his own paraphrase of the
passage in question.
Finally, in addition to the foregoing difficulties,
there is an even more convincing reason for doubting the
correctness of White's interpretation of Aristotle's so-
lution to the Coriscus Puzzle.
In De Sophisticis Elenchls
,
Aristotle's main pro-
ject is, of course, to classify fallacies. The argument
that gives rise to the Coriscus Puzzle is an example of what
Aristotle calls the fallacy nape* to crujj.pe/S'yjKo^ —or, as
l^White, op , cit
.
,
p. 179.
11
I shall call it, ’’the fallacy of accidence
.
"17 In later
chapters I shall discuss the nature of this fallacy in
some detail. But for now it is sufficient to point out
that, on Aristotle's view, at least part of what has gone
wrong in the Coriscus argument is that the proponent of
the argument has made use of a fallacious principle. But
what is this principle?
In De Sophistlcis Elenchis l?9a26ff. Aristotle
says
,
With respect to arguments from accidence, one and the
same solution [suffices] for all. For, since it is
undetermined whether that which is said belongs to the
subject whenever it belongs to the accident, and since
in some cases it is thought to and said to, but in
others this is said to be not necessary, we ought,
therefore, in all cases alike, when a conclusion has
been reached, say that it is not necessary. But it is
necessary to have an examp le to bring forward. All
such arguments as those following are from accidence.
'Do you know what I am about to ask you?' 'Do you
know the one approaching or the masked one?’ 'Is the
statue your work?' or 'Is the dog your father?' 'Are
the few taken a few times a few?' It is clear in all
these cases [i.e. in the counter-examples just men-
tioned] that it is not necessary that the attribute
be true of the accident and the subject.
The suggestion here seems to be that the fallacious prin-
ciple that is operative in arguments such as the one that
gives rise to the Coriscus Puzzle (i.e. the "Do you know
the one approaching?" paradox) is a principle to the effect
^Of course, 'accidence', as used here, is a word
of my own invention. My use of the word has nothing to do
with the grammarian's use on which it refers to that part
of grammar concerned with inflections. Rather, as I use
it, it designates the relation, "being an accident of."
The "fallacy of accidence," as will be seen, is a fallacy
Involving entities which are related in this way.
12
that a given thing has all the attributes that its acci-
dents have. We might express the principle as follows:
(P6) If x is an accident of y, then if x has P then
y has F.
White tells us that Aristotle’s view is that in
order to solve the Coriscus Puzzle, we should give up
Leibniz’ Law—i.e. (P2). But, according to the above
passage, Aristotle’s position is that the key to the so-
lution of such paradoxes lies in the rejection of the prin-
ciple (P6). And although the meaning of (P6) stands in
need of explication, it is my view—and I shall argue the
point later—that it is certainly not equivalent to, nor is
it even implied by, (P2).-^ Consequently, I think it is
safe to say that the rejection of (P6) is not incompatible
with the continued acceptance of (?2). In other words, if
Aristotle thinks that in order to solve such paradoxes as
the Coriscus Puzzle, we must give up (P6), he is not there-
by committed to the rejection of Leibniz' Law.
In conclusion, then, not only has White offered
little or no reason to suppose that Aristotle's solution to
the Coriscus Puzzle consists in the rejection of Leibniz’
Law; but, in addition, the text itself seems to indicate
that Aristotle has in mind a rather different solution.
18 See Ch. III.
13
The Substitut ivlty Interpretation
One of the most concentrated efforts—at least in
recent years—to provide an account of Aristotle’s treat-
ment of the Coriscus Puzzle is to be found in S. L.
Peterson’s dissertation. The Masker Paradox . 19 I find
myself in agreement with a number of points that Peterson
makes; but there are basic issues on which we clearly disa-
gree. In this section I propose, first, to sketch the key
elements of Peterson’s view, which, for reasons that will
become clear, I shall label "the substitutivity interpre-
tation." Then, as with the indiscernibility interpretation,
I shall go on to present several reasons why I find the
substitutivity interpretation unsatisfactory.
Reconstruction of the Coriscus Puzzle . Although
the argument—call it "Al”
—
(1) You know Coriscus
(2) You do not know the one approaching
(3) Coriscus is the one approaching
,*.(4) You know and you do not know the same thing
seems to have the virtue of incorporating a quite literal
translation of the textual clues for the Coriscus Puzzle,
Peterson is not satisfied with it as a representation of the
argument that Aristotle has In mind. Her reason is that Al
"invites one to suppose that the 'know’ is the 'know’ of
acquaintance, because the reconstruction gives ’know’ a
19 S . L. Peterson, The Masker Paradox , esp. chs . I
and III.
msingular object which is a name of a person." "The invi-
tation is unfortunate," Peterson continues,
for if it is taken up, the argument turns out to have
the rather obviously false premiss. The supposed
paradox has a simple resolution, then, and one that
Aristotle would doubtless have mentioned if he had
noticed it. Aristotle counts arguments with false
premisses as criticizable in that respect, as being,
let’s say, unconvincing. Moreover, the inference
of argument [Al] seems perfectly unobjectionable.
There are no evident counter-examples to a principle
that urges one to deal with the ’know' of acquaintance
as it is dealt with here . But Aristotle seems con-
cerned to say that it does not follow from the pre-
misses he has in mind that you know and do not know
the same thing. 20
What is needed in an adequate reconstruction of
Aristotle's argument, according to Peterson, is "some verb
to translate what is usually rendered ’know’ in the argu-
ment which will allow that
You . . . Coriscus ...
You . . . the one approaching
may differ in truth value, even though Coriscus is the one
approaching . 21 But Peterson thinks there is no such verb
in English. So she suggests that each of the expressions
’know Coriscus’ and 'know the one approaching' might be
eliminated in favor of ’know who Coriscus is' and 'know who
the one approaching is', respectively.
These latter expressions, however, are taken by
Peterson to be "rather viciously indeterminate as to the
necessary and sufficient conditions for their being true
20 Ibid
. ,
p . 21
.
21 Ibid
. ,
p. 28.
15
of someone. "22 Yet she claims that such conditions can be
fixed by the addition of a qualification as in 'You know
who Coriscus is with respect to his being the darkest one
in the market', or 'you know who Churchill is with respect
to hi s role in the war cabinet '. And, having gone this
far, Peterson suggests one further—what seems to her
—
quite natural step:
When 'know who Coriscus is' or 'know who Churchill is'
are fixed in sense and truth conditions in the way
indicated, by the addition of some appropriate quali-
fication such as 'with respect to his role in the war
Cabinet', it looks clear that the necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for your knowing who Churchill,
for example, is with respect to his role in the war
Cabinet is your knowing that Churchill is the war
Prime Minister. And, we can imagine a situation in
which knowing who Coriscus is for the purpose of some
conversation is knowing that Coriscus is the darkest-
one in the market-place. The locution 'knows that
Coriscus is such and such' is simpler and more natural
than 'knows who Coriscus is with respect to such and
such', and it is as clear what are the conditions of
its being true of you as it is clear what are the
conditions of the former's being true of you.o
So, finally, the outcome of Peterson’s line of think-
ing is the following reconstruction of the Coriscus Puzzle:
A2: (1) You know that Coriscus is the darkest one in
tl"i0 market •
(2) You do not know that the one approaching is
the darkest one in the market
.
(3) Coriscus is the one approaching.
;> ( 4 ) You do not know that Coriscus is the darkest
one in the market
.
22jbid. p. 30. Peterson, then, seems to be sympa
thetic to what Chisholm has called a "pragmatic
1 treatment
of 'knows who'. (See Roderick M. Chisholm, The Logic
of
Knowing, " p . 790 )
.
23ibid.
,
pp« 31-32.
16
(5) You do and do not know that Coriscus is the
darkest one in the market. 24
The Sophist’s Principle . The problematic move in
A2, according to Peterson's reading of Aristotle, is from
lines (2) and (3) to line (4). How might a proponent of
the argument-let us call him "the sophist"—try to justify
that step? According to Peterson, "The rule which the
sophist uses to justify his argument seems to have been the
rule [call it "SP"]:
If x is y (or, if y is an accident of x) then infer
that anything true of x is true of y."2$
Evidence for this, says Peterson, is to be found in the
fact that this is the rule that Aristotle is out to reject
(see SE l66b26-32; 179a30-31; 179a36).
But how, more precisely, would Peterson have us
understand the sophist's principle, SP? We get some help
in the following remark. "It is at least; clear," says
Peterson, "that it is being supposed [by Aristotle] that
Leibniz’ Law is the principle that the sophist would offer
2^ibid., p. 32. My advisor, Gareth B. Matthews, has
drav/n my attention to the fact that, whatever else might be
said for or against this version of the Coriscus Puzzle, it
does not have the conclusion that Aristotle conceives of the
paradox as having. As Peterson, herself, points out earlier
( The Masker Paradox , p. 21), "... Aristotle seems con-
cerned to say that it does not follow from the premisses he
has in mind that you know and do not know the same thing."
Of course, Peterson might reply that the "thing” in question
is the proposition, that Coriscus is the darkest one in the
market. But it seems unlikely that this is the sort ol
"thing" that Aristotle had in mind.
2 5ibid., p. 116 .
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in justification of his argument . "26
. Thus the principle
SP seems to be regarded as none other than Leibniz' Law.
But what is Peterson here calling "Leibniz' Law"?
At the beginning of her second chapter, Peterson
claims to give us a number of different formulations of
the principle which she proposes to call "Leibniz' Law."
Carnap puts the principle this way:
The principle of interchangeability (or sub-
st itutivity )
.
~
The principle occurs in either of two forms:
a. If two expressions name the same entity, then
a true sentence remains true when the one is
replaced in it by the other. In our termi-
nology . . . the two expressions are inter-
changeable (everywhere).
b. If an identity sentence " . . . = " (or
"... is identical with " or " . . .
is the same as . . . ") is true, then the two
argument expressions " . . . " and " " are
interchangeable (everywhere).
Russell puts It another, rather confusing, way:
If a is identical with b, whatever is true of
the one is true of the other, and either may be
substituted for the other in any proposition
without altering the truth or falsehood of that
proposition
.
It occurs as a rule of inference in Kalish and Montague:
From r $ = yp and 0C*;'] we may infer (pLrjl where \
and rj are names and the formula pZrjJ is obtained
from the formula
cf> L£,H by replacing an occurrence
of C, by r).
Another is given by Church, following Frege:
When a constituent name is replaced by another hav-
ing the same denotation, the denotation of the
entire name is not changed. 27
Of these four formulations, the three most precise (i.e.
Carnap's, Kalish and Montague’s, and Church's—Peterson
herself finds Russell's principle unclear) plainly have to
26 Ibid
. ,
p. 114.
2
"
lbid
.
,
pp. 46-47.
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do with substitution of co-designative expressions in
larger expressions. It seems, then, that Peterson is using
the name ’Leibniz’ Law’ to refer to a principle of substi-
tutivity. And since the sophist’s principle—SP— is, ac-
cording to Peterson, none other than Leibniz’ Law, it
appears that SP, itself, is here to be treated as a meta-
linguistic principle.
Of course, the main advantage of a metalinguistic
reading of SP is that it does provide a justification for
the move from lines (2) and (3) to (4) in Peterson’s
reconstruction of Aristotle's argument, given that
’Coriscus’ and 'the one approaching' are co-designative
terms. Let us, for convenience, adopt Carnap's first for-
mulation of "the principle of interchangeability" as the
reading that Peterson proposes for SP. Then, from that
principle, we can conclude that since (as Peterson thinks
Aristotle allows) 'Coriscus' and 'the one approaching’ name
the same entity, and 'You do not know that the one approach-
ing is the darkest one in the market’ is true, that 'You
do not know that Coriscus is the darkest one in the market’
is true.
What we have so far, then, is a reconstruction of
the Coriscus argument which has the virtue of being such
that all its premisses may be true together, although its
conclusion is a contradiction. Moreover, Peterson has
given us, in terms of a familiar and not altogether im-
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plausible principle (at least, perhaps at first glance), a
reading of the rule that she takes Aristotle's sophist to
be employing in the argument. We are in a position, now,
to turn to Peterson's account of Aristotle's solution to
the paradox.
The Solution . It is clear that Aristotle's response
to the proponent of the Coriscus Puzzle consists, at least
in part, in the objection that the argument that gives rise
to the puzzle is invalid. Thus Peterson, after citing SE
179b2-4 ("So it is not: the case that if I know Coriscus but
do not know the one approaching that I know and do not know
the same one"), goes on to say, "It is clear from this last
remark that part of Aristotle's solution to the paradox is
to say that the inference does not follow. "28
To be more specific, Peterson claims that the precise
point at which the argument goes awry is in the move from
lines (2) and (3) to (4) (of A2). We have been told that
the principle that the sophist offers in defence of that
move is SP. So, on Peterson's view, Aristotle fixes on the
appeal to SP as the flaw in the sophist's puzzle. In
Petersen's words, "Aristotle . . . would say that Leibniz'
Law [i.e. SP] has been applied, but that it is a faulty
principle . "29
In addition, however, Peterson suggests that Aris-
28ibid.
,
p. 77.
29 ibid
.
,
p. 114.
20
totle goes on to specify just what conditions are necessary
for substitut ivity (salva veritate) in propositional know-
ledge contexts. She finds these conditions in Aristotle's
remark that—as she expresses it at one point— " ... only
if things are not different in respect of substance and
are one thing do all the same things belong to them" (SE
179 a 37- 39 ) . 30 Thus, Peterson proposes, interchangeability
of two designators, Ei and E 2 , in propositional knowledge
contexts, is held by Aristotle to be truth-preserving only
in cases in which
rEl is not different in respect of substance and is
one thing with £ 2^
is true. 31
But how are we to determine whether this last
condition holds? In response to this, Peterson directs
our attention to SE 179bI-2:
For it is not the same thing for the good to be [the]
good and to be going to be asked about, nor for the
one approaching or masked to be [the one] approaching
and to be Coriscus.
These remarks, says Peterson, may be taken to suggest a
30ibid., pp. 107-108. Peterson takes Aristotle's
remark to amount to at least this. She does, however, allow
that Aristotle may have intended to state the biconditional
All the same things belong to x and to y if and only if
(a) x and y are not different in respect of sub-
stance
and
(b) x and y are one thing (with each other).
Yet I find her defence of this latter point unconvincing.
3^-Ibid
.
,
p . 136 .
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test for the satisfaction of
rEi is not different in respect of substance and is
one thing with E 2 1 .
That is, Peterson thinks that Aristotle is here proposing
the principle
If r E 2 is not different in respect of substance and
is one thing with E2~ is true then r to be Ex is to
be E2"7 is true. 32
Thus, to summarize, Peterson’s interpretation is
that interchangeability of two expressions. Ex and E2 , in
knowledge contexts requires that
r Eq is not different in respect of substance and is
one thing with E 2
*
1
be true. And the truth of this latter sentence requires
the truth of
rto be Ex is to be E 2
"
1
.
So interchangeability of Ex and E 2 in knowledge contexts
will be legitimate only if
rto be Ex is to be E 2
1
is true. In Peterson's own words,
. . .
substitutivity in one kind of non-extensional
context is made a necessary condition of substi-
tutivity in another kind of non-extensional context,
according to . . . Aristotle. . . . Aristotle requires
that expressions substitutable in knowledge contexts
are also substitutable in ' is not different in res-
pect of substance from ’ and 'to be is to be '.3
The Coriscus Puzzle, then, on Peterson's inter-
32 Ibid
.
33 ibid
.
p. 1^9.
uo
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pretation of Aristotle, is generated- by an appeal to the
fallacious principle, SP . In his solution to the puzzle,
Peterson’s Aristotle not only argues that the principle is
false; but he also states a condition that would have to
be met before
(*0 You do not know that Coriscus is the darkest one
in the market
could be derived from
(2) You do not know that the one approaching is the
darkest one in the market,
and
(3) Coriscus is the one approaching.
That condition is that
To be Coriscus is to be the one approaching
would have to be true—which, of course, according to
Peterson, is not the case. Thus, in addition to arguing
that SP is the faulty principle in the Coriscus Puzzle, we
might say that Peterson’s Aristotle has tried to explain
why it is so.
# # #
Plainly, the substitutivity interpretation brings
Aristotle very much up-to-date. For it has him concerned
with current problems of referential opacity, or, more
specifically, substitutivity of identity in propositional
knowledge contexts. But there are a few points that suggest
that we would do well to reflect a little further before
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saddling Aristotle with this particular interpretation.
First, let me make some general remarks about
Peterson's reconstruction of the Coriscus argument. As
Peterson herself acknowledges, her own reconstruction—
A2—is quite different from the literal version of Aris-
totle's argument—Al. Whereas the literal version has
each of the various occurrences of 'know' followed simply
by a singular term, on Peterson's reconstruction each
occurrence of 'know' is followed by a ' that ' -clause
.
This raises, I think, some question as to whether
Peterson’s interpretation is starting off on the right
track. Clearly, Peterson's reconstruction is designed to
set the stage for an interpretation that has Aristotle
dealing with the problem of the intersubst itutivity of
co-designative expressions in propositional knowledge con-
texts. But, as nice as it might be to find Aristotle
undertaking such a project, it is not at all clear to me
that this is what he is doing. As indicated already, there
is no hint in the relevant passages that Aristotle is here
concerned with "propositional knowledge contexts"—in fact
the evidence is to the contrary; nor is there, as far as I
can see, any suggestion of a worry specifically about the
"inter substitutivity of co-designative expressions" in
epistemic contexts. But I shall say more about this in a
later chapter. 3^
3^See Ch. IV.
A second reservation that I have about the sub-
stitutivity interpretation concerns Peterson's charac-
terization of the sophist's principle. As she under-
stands it, that principle is Aristotle's version of Leib-
niz' Law. Aristotle's way out of the Coriscus Puzzle,
then, involves the denial of Leibniz' Law. However,
Peterson herself is puzzled by the fact that earlier, in
Topics 152a33ff*, Aristotle says,
[If it is alleged that a and b are the same, one
ought] to consider them on the basis of what are
accidents to them and those things to which they are
accidents. For such things as are accidents to the
one ought also to be accidents to the other. (Peter-
son's translation)
And later, at 152b25ff
. ,
he adds that
[If It Is alleged that a and b are the same, one
ought] to speak generally, to consider, on the basis
of what are predicated of each of them in any way what-
soever, and on the basis of those things of which these
are predicated, whether there is a disagreement any-
where. For such things as are predicated of the one
ought also to be predicated of the other. (Petersen's
translation)
Such passages, Peterson thinks, clearly indicate an endorse-
ment of Leibniz' Law. And thus, as she sees it, there seems
to be a conflict between Aristotle's views on Leibniz' Law
in Topics and De Sophisticis Elenchis . Peterson discusses
this difficulty at some length. But ultimately she con-
cludes that Aristotle is here being plainly inconsistent,
although, she adds, "It is not clear whether he [Aristotle]
is changing his mind about the doctrine of the Topics ,
25
or whether he is unwittingly contradicting himself. "35
Peterson, then, like White, thinks that there is a
problem in reconciling what Aristotle says about the
Coriscus Puzzle (in SE) with what he has said earlier in
Topics, 152a33ff. and 152b25ff. But such allegations of
inconsistency seem to me to leave at least some question as
to whether the relevant passages have been properly under-
stood
.
Finally, we should perhaps consider, briefly, how
well Aristotle comes out on the view attributed to him by
Peterson's substitutivity interpretation.
Peterson tells us that Aristotle's diagnosis of
the flaw in the Coriscus argument is that an illegitimate
substitution has been made between the lines
(2) You do not know that the one approaching is the
darkest one in the market
and
(4) You do not know that Coriscus is the darkest one
in the market.
The sophist has substituted 'Coriscus' for 'the one
approaching' simply on the strength of the premiss
(3) Coriscus is the one approaching
According to Peterson, Aristotle points out that the
mere identity statement— (3)— is not sufficient to guaran-
tee intersubstitutivity salva veritate in knowledge contexts
such as (2) and (4). And she goes on to suggest that what
35peterson, op.cit. p. 142.
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Aristotle requires is, in fact, that "expressions substi-
tutable in knowledge contexts be also substitutable in
' is n°t different in respect of substance from ' and
’ to be is to be '"—a condition that Aristotle thinks
is not satisfied by 'Coriscus' and 'the one approaching'.
But some would argue—rightly, I think—that a
sufficient condition for the truth of
rYou (do not) know that o< is (p
is that
rYou (do not) know that p is cp'
1
and
rYou know that o< is p~
be true. Thus, to derive
(4) You do not know that Coriscus is the darkest one
in the market,
it seems that all we need is
(2) You do not know that the one approaching is the
darkest one in the market
together with the additional premiss
You know that Coriscus is the one approaching.
And, if this is correct, then the truth of
to be Coriscus is to be the one approaching
is clearly not a necessary condition for the interchange-
ability of 'Coriscus' and 'the one approaching' in the
premisses of the Coriscus argument. 36 More generally, the
36i am assuming, of course, that
You know that Coriscus is the one approaching
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truth of
rto be cy is to be jP
is not a necessary condition for the interchangeability of
cy and p, in prepositional knowledge contexts.
Peterson's Aristotle, then, may be talking about
very up-to-date issues; but this aspect of his solution
is clearly an unfortunate one. And again, it seems to me,
this provokes the question, "Is Aristotle really committed
to the view here ascribed to him?"
A Final Criticism of Both the Indiscernibility
and the Substitutlvity Interpretation
I have raised a number of difficulties with respect
to each of the interpretations under discussion. But there
remains one important worry that concerns both the indis-
cernibility and the substitutivity interpretations.
It should be kept in mind that, as mentioned al-
ready, Aristotle's discussion of the Coriscus Puzzle takes
place in the context of an attempt to classify and provide
solutions for various kinds of fallacies. The argument
that gives rise to the Coriscus Puzzle is said by Aristotle
to fall into the class of arguments that commit the "fallacy
of accidence" (rro^ooc to cru
^
p
z
5). The Coriscus Puzzle,
then, is taken to be just one of a number of paradoxes all
of which may be resolved in the same way:
does not imply
to be Coriscus is to be the one approaching.
28
TTpoj Se. Tou^ TTocpOf' TO crujA&E.pr^Koj pc# ^EV
rj o<^vrj Au cri,^ ir^ooy 0< 1T0<VTCX <5
(With respect to arguments from accidence, one and
the same solution [suffices] for all.) (SE 179a26-2?)
Without undertaking, at this point, to say any
more about the solution referred to here, let me make an
observation about the list of arguments to which Aristotle
claims it is applicable. There is, in addition to the
Coriscus Puzzle, at least one other paradox of accidence
that involves epistemic contexts. However, as will become
plain in the next chapter, the majority of Aristotle’s
examples have nothing to do with epistemic contexts. In
fact, it is not at all obvious, at least at first glance,
just how these sophisms might have been thought by Aris-
totle to bear any significant resemblance to the Coriscus
Puzzle at all.
But whether or not it is evident to us that
Aristotle's various examples resemble each other, it is
clear that a necessary condition for the correctness of
any proposed interpretation of Aristotle's solution to the
Coriscus Puzzle is that a somewhat reasonable case can be
made for the applicability of that solution, so interpreted,
to each of the other sophisms. I myself fail to see how
either of the foregoing interpretations might be thought to
meet this condition.
Thus I am inclined to think that we must retrace
our steps, and, after setting out the various examples of
paradoxes of accidence, proceed from there to try to de-
29
velop an interpretation that, among other things, lends
some plausibility to Aristotle’s contention that "one and
the same solution [suffices] for all."
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CHAPTER II ••
ARISTOTLE'S EXAMPLES OP ARGUMENTS PROM ACCIDENCE
Sources
De Sophisticis Elenchis contains a number of allu-
sions to various examples of arguments from accidence.
But although some of these arguments are laid out in full,
not all are. In fact some of them are simply referred to
by expressions such as 'olScjj 8 ^L.\)\co oe ; ' ('Do
you know that which I am going to ask you about?' )1 and
'-Ct* oA <y'<xK<-5 ohCycx. o\iyc\ ;' ('Is a few taken a few times
a few?'). ^ Consequently, even before one approaches the
task of trying to understand why Aristotle classified his
various examples as sophisms "ttcxyoci to crvyLfStpyjKof y " one
must look around for clues that might indicate, at least
roughly, how each of them should be formulated.
Aside from the text of De Sophisticis Elenchis
itself, where are we to find such clues to the reconstruc-
tion of Aristotle's examples? In what follows, I have
relied upon three main groups of sources.
First, there is a limited amount of ancient
literature that contains reference to and discussion of
what appear to be "stock' 1 examples of sophisms of the
time. Of particular relevance to Aristotle's examples of
1SE 179a33-
2SE 179a35.
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the fallacy of accidence are Plato
'
s’ Euthvdemus and
Diogenes Laertius' Lives of Emine nt Philosophers .
3
Second, a number of Mediaeval treatises contain
suggestions about how Aristotle's examples might be con-
strued—e.g. William of Sherwood's Introduc tiones in
Logic am ^ and Duns Scotus' Quaestiones in Libros Elencnorum.5
And here one should also mention L. M. De Rijk's Logica
Modernum: A Contribution to the History of Early Term-
inist Logic (Vol. 1)6 which, among other things, incorpo-
rates valuable textual material.
Finally, I have taken account of several more re-
cent translations of and commentaries on De Sophisticis
Elenchis . These include works by Poste,7 Tricot, 8 Joseph,?
3lt should be added that both the Euthydemus and
the Lives of Eminent Philosophers are valuable sources for
examples of other fallacies too.
^William of Sherwood, Introduction to Logic
,
tr.
with introduction and notes by Norman Kretzmann (Minneapolis
University of Minnesota Press, 1966), pp . 150-153*
5john Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Elenchorum
,
vol. 2, Opera Omnia (Paris: Vives^ 1891), Q.uns , XLIII - XLIX
^L. M. De Rijk, Logica Modernum: A Contribution
to the History of Early Terminlst Logic (vol~ I ) , (As sen
:
Koninklijke Van Gorcum and Comp. N. V., 1962).
^Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies or the
Sophistici Elenchi (London: Macmillan and Co . , 1866).
8 j. Tricot, Aristote: Organon VI: Les Refutations
Sophistiques (Paris: Librairie J. Vrin, i 960).
1916).
9h. W. B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic (Oxford,
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Peterson, 10 and Hamblin. 11
The Epistemic Paradoxes
Two of Aristotle’s examples of paradoxes of acci-
dence might be labelled ’’epistemic," since they both in-
volve the concept of knowledge. One of these, of course,
is the Coriscus Puzzle. The other will be referred to as
the "Do you know that which I am going to ask you about?"
The Coriscus Puzzle . or the "Do you know the one
approaching ?" Aristotle first refers to the Coriscus
Puzzle at SE 179a3^. The reference is made simply by way
of the question "o<p> olSctj tov TTpoo-(6 vtcx . . . ;"
As indicated already, at the outset of the previous chap-
ter, a clue to the way the argument proceeds is found at
179b3-4:
. . . ouk ol&cx, tov Kop (.ctkoVj oryVoco <5e rov*
TT/OOCr coVTc*, Tov' cxuTOV olc^c* kcc( cfyv'ocu •
(. . . it is not the case that if I know Coriscus,
but do not know the one approaching, that I know and
do not know the same thing.)
and, on the basis of this, the following reconstruction
seems, I have suggested, reasonable:
(1) You know Coriscus.
(2) You do not know the one approaching.
(3) Coriscus is the one approaching.
(4) You know and you do not know the same thing.
10 S . L. Peterson, The Masker Paradox (unpublished
Ph. D. dissertation, Princeton, 1969).
llC . L. Hamblin, Fallacies (London: Methuen and
Co., 197°).
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There are, however, two brief additional remarks
about this reconstruction that should be made at this
point
.
First, some have urged that the verb ’know’, in
its various occurrences throughout the Coriscus argument,
might be taken to be equivocal. For example, Poste sug-
gests that "The fallacy seems really equivocation, a con-
fusion between the two senses of knowledge, old ac-
quaintance, and recognition oh a particular occasion. "12
But, as Peterson has pointed out, had Aristotle conceived
of the Coriscus Puzzle in this way, we should expect him
to have included it under the heading of paradoxes "u&ioa.
X i c< y " ( equivocation ) , or some other such head-
ing. 13 Yet he does not. Thus, in the interests of pre-
senting a reconstruction of the paradox which is faithful
to Aristotle’s concerns, it seems to me that we should re-
quire that the verb ’know', in all of its occurrences
throughout the argument, be taken to have a single meaning.
Second, however, although one might avoid the trap
of casting Aristotle's paradox as a paradox of equivocation
on 'know', one might, nevertheless, be tempted to suppose
that the sentences containing 'know' are really elliptical
for sentences containing somewhat more complicated con-
^Edward Poste, op . cit . , p. 156.
13 S . L. Peterson, op . cit . , p. 26.
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structions. For instance, one might think that, e.g.,
You know Coriscus
should be treated as elliptical for
You know who Coriscus is,
or
You know that Coriscus is such-and-suchl4
or perhaps even something like
You know, with respect to certain properties that are
essential to Coriscus and to no one else, that Coriscus
is the man who has these properties . 15
For then, since
You know who . . . is
,
etc., are well-recognized opaque contexts, it might be held
that it becomes clearer how it is possible for all of the
premisses of the Coriscus Puzzle to be true together. 16
But whatever the merits of such an approach, and
l^Recall (as outlined in my Chapter I) Peterson’s
suggestion about the rejection of
You know Coriscus
in favor of
You know who Coriscus is,
and the subsequent transition from the latter to
You know that Coriscus is [e.g.] the darkest one in the
market
.
l^This analysis of 'You know Coriscus’ is to be
found in Chisholm’s "The Logic of Knowing," p. 791, where
he (Chisholm) sketches what he calls "the traditional so-
lution" to the Coriscus Puzzle.
l6in The Masker Paradox
,
19ff*, Peterson in fact
argues that unless one formulates the argument in such a way
as to avoid having the several occurrences of ’know’
followed simply by singular terms, it cannot be the case
that all the premisses of the argument are true together.
See my Chapter I.
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however appealing such a move might be to a contemporary
philosopher, there is no evidence that Aristotle was,
himself, inclined to think in such terms. He seems to
view a sentence such as ’You know Coriscus' as simply
ascribing to coriscus the attribute, being known by you.
And this, I think, must be kept clearly in mind if we are
to understand the key features of Aristotle’s own solution
of the Coriscus Puzzle.
The ”Do you know that which I am going to ask you
about ?
”
Aristotle's other "epistemic" paradox of accidence
is mentioned at SE 179a33-3^. It is referred to by way of
the question, ”... 6 yu&AAco cr^ c^oj-cc*v;” But
nowhere in the text is the argument stated in full.
AT 179bl-3, however, we are given a further hint
about the argument. There Aristotle says,
TCj OU totieoV e.O'Tcv’ c*yc*<9cJ Z* £(Vou
KoU y^e-AAovTc. eyO U)'Co(CrQo< <_
>
ou &£, "CcO -TTyoocrtov-c c . . .
TT/OOO'tOV'CC Te Ccvai. Ko(l Kop(crxco
(But with respect to the good, it is not the same to
be the good and to be something about to be asked
[about]; nor with respect to the one approaching . . .
is it the same for the one approaching to be, and for
Coriscus to be
. )
The latter part of this quotation warns us that to be (the
one) approaching is not the same as to be Coriscus; and the
former part tells us that to be (the) good is not the same
as to be (that which is) going to be asked about. Thus,
just as ’the one approaching’ and ’Coriscus’ are key terms
in the Coriscus Puzzle, it seems reasonable to suppose that
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•that which I am going to ask you about’ and ’the good’
are key terms in the "Do you know that which I am going to
ask you about?"
Yet how, precisely, should the argument be recon-
structed? Since Aristotle treats his various examples as
instances of' one and the same fallacy, it seems fair that
we should try, as far as possible, to formulate the argu-
ments in such a way that they resemble each other in form.
Thus, in attempting to reconstruct the "Do you know that
which I am going to ask you about?" I think we would do
well to take the Coriscus Puzzle as a model.
If we do adopt this approach, then it seems to
me that a quite straightforward version of the paradox
presently under discussion suggests itself. It is
simply this:
(1) You do not knew that which I am going to ask
you about. ^7
(2) You know the good.
(3) The good is that which I am going to ask you
about
.
(4) You know and you do not know the same thing.
Of course, as I did with respect to the Coriscus
Puzzle, I should want to say of this paradox that the
17it should be noted here that I have followed
Poste and Peterson in translating ’ i.ptoTo^'j ’ as 'to
ask . . . about ' . If we were to translate it simply as 'to
ask', then my premiss (3) would read 'The good is that which
I am going to ask you’ and this sounds a bit odd. Inter-
estingly enough, however, neither Poste nor Peterson really
need the addition of 'about' to make the corresponding
premisses of their reconstructions sound natural. (Their
versions are to be found below.)
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meaning of ’know’, throughout, must be held constant,
furthermore, there is, again, no suggestion that Aristotle
thinks of, e
.
g.
,
You know the good
as elliptical for a more complicated construction such as
You know what the good is.
’You know the good’ says simply—on Aristotle’s view—that
the good has the attribute, being known by you.
Other versions of the "Do you know that which I am
going to ask you about?" have, of course, been proposed.
For example, Poste has suggested that the argument is this:
You do not know what I am going to ask you about; I
am going to ask you about the nature of the Summum
Bonum; therefore you do not know the nature of the
Summum Bonum.
^
And Peterson has urged the following:
1. You do not know [what] that which I am going to
ask you about [is].
2. You do know [what] the good [is].
3
.
The good is that which I am going to ask you about .
4. You both know and do not know the same thing . 19
Note that ’know' in premisses 1. and 2. of Peterson's
version is followed, not by a singular term, as my version
has it, but by '[what] . .
.
[is]'. Yet, whatever her rea-
sons for introducing this more complicated construction
(and I suspect the reasons are similar to those for which
l^Edward Poste, op . cit .
,
p. 73*
19s. L. Peterson, op . cit
. ,
p. 42.
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she did the same with respect to the Coriscus Puzzle), 20
it seems to me that, as stated before, such an addition to
what we actually find in the text is unwarranted, and may,
perhaps, even tend to obscure the way Aristotle's own
solution proceeds.
Poste's reconstruction, on the other hand, is
consonant with mine in the respect just mentioned. That
is, ’know' is followed, in each of its occurrences, by a
singular term. Of course, as it is formulated above,
Poste's argument is a_uite different from Peterson's as
well as from mine. In fact, it appears to be, at best, a
sub-inference of the argument as Peterson and I construe
it. But it would not take much to fill out Poste's sug-
gestion in such a way as to bring it into line with these
others. Retaining the key terms of Poste's argument, it
might be reformulated as follows:
(1) You do not know what I am going to ask you about.
(2) You know the nature of the Summum Bonum.
(3) The nature of the Summum Bonum is what I am going
to ask you about.
.*,(4) You know and you do not know the same thing.
And, in that case, Poste's version would differ from my own
in only minor respects. 21
20s. L. Peterson, op . clt . , pp. 18-36. See also
my Chapter I.
2^1 can see no justification—nor, for that matter,
need— for introducing, as Poste does, the expression 'the
nature of '
.
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The Diversity Paradoxes
In De Sophisticis Elenchis
, Aristotle’s first
remarks on the fallacy of accidence are found at l66b28ff.
In addition to a brief statement of what the fallacy is,
Aristotle there provides two examples of arguments that com-
mit that fallacy. I shall call these sophisms "the di-
versity paradoxes."
The First Diversity Paradox
. SE l66b33-34 contains
a clear statement of the first diversity paradox:
...£<- O KoplcrKOS £T£|OOV kvGpc^rtov, ocu-COt, oioTOU
• CcTTc. Y^P OCJTV05 •
(. . .if Coriscus is other than man, he is other
than himself; for he is (a) man.)
The ' ec ’ suggests that ’ c Kop(cn<o 5 £-£yoov c<vdp6'Rou' is a
premiss. Likewise, the 'yap' indicates that ’ zcr-cl . . .
avGpujTToj' is a premiss. The conclusion, then, seems
clearly to be Vut05 <wurou e.'czpo^' .
Thus, when translated and arranged in the form of
an argument, the sophism is this:
Coriscus is other than man
He is (a) man
.-.He is other than himself;
or, replacing the pronouns,
Coriscus is other than man
Coriscus is (a) man
.-.Coriscus is other than Coriscus.
Poste offers a slightly different version from the
one just presented. He translates the first premiss as 'a
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man is not Coriscus'. 22 That is, he treats ’(a) man',
instead of 'Coriscus', as the subject. As far as I can
see, from a philosophical point of view, this difference
is of little or no significance . 23 Yet, since, in the text,
we find ' o Kojoco-koj' (nominative case) and ' ocmQjO ujttou *
(genitive of comparison— ’than man'), I prefer my own trans-
lation to Poste's. 2 ^
But Poste's premiss has another feature that mine
does not. In his first premiss, 'man' is preceded by the
indefinite article. In mine, it is not. Thus, whereas
my version of the first premiss seems to have the force of
something like 'Coriscus is other than the species man',
Poste's version suggests something more like 'Coriscus is
other than some man'
.
Of course, classical Greek does not have an in-
definite article. So closer inspection of the text is not
^ 2Edward Poste, op . cit
.
,
p. 13.
2 3to clarify, I mean that (as I shall urge later)
Aristotle seems to regard 'Coriscus is other than (a) man'
as attributing "otherness-with-respec t-to-Coriscus ' to (a)
man. And I presume that he would allow that '(A) man is
other than Coriscus' does the same.
2i| Poste, however, is not alone in reading the premiss
under consideration in the way that he does. The author (s)
of the Summa Sophist icorum Elencorum (edited by De Rijk, and
contained in Logica Ifodernorum , Vol. I) represented the
argument in this way:
Coriscus est homo
homo autem est alter a Corisco , quia Socrates ergo
Coriscus est alter a Corisco. (De Rijk, op c it .
,
p.
356—the emphasis is mine).
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likely to resolve this latter difference between Poste’s
version of the first premiss and my own. 2 5 Moreover,
since both readings are true, each seems, in this respect,
to be qualified to serve as a premiss of the sophism.
Thus, in view of the fact that it is not clear
just how the first premiss is to be understood—whether
as
Coriscus is other than man,
or as
Coriscus is other than some man
—
I shall leave the question open, and indicate this by in-
serting a parenthesized ’some’. My proposal for the re-
construction of the first diversity paradox, then, is
this :
(1) Coriscus is other than (some) man.
(2) Coriscus is (a) man.
.*.(3) Coriscus is other than Coriscus.
The Second Diversity Paradox . Immediately following
his statement of the first diversity paradox, Aristotle
presents a second, slightly different, sophism:
X zzz.pos 7 o Sz, XcjKpcx'trrj^ otvQpurT05,
£T£OOV O(\^0pcOTTOO CJploAoyrj/<£.'w, OC(. ...
( . . . if (he, it) is other than Socrates, and Socrates
is (a) man, they say that it has been agreed that (he.
250f course, if Aristotle had wanted to make it clear
that the proposition intended is that Coriscus Is other than
some man, he might have said ’ o Kop<.crKos e-repo v 01^05
kvepAno u ’ . But the fact that he did not is not, by itself,
a convincing argument against the view that this is in fact
what was intended.
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it) is other than man.)
(SE l66b34-35)
Again, ohe indicates that '
. . . ^coKpci'Couj Lteoo^'
is a premiss; the 'Si' suggests that ' 6 . .
. Zco,<p^ 5
Zvep^iroy ls additional information, and, hence, another
premiss; and the '^o-^ wpoAo y^K^vcu’ (’they say that it
has been agreed’) makes it clear that 'ecepov lotto u 1
is the conclusion. These clues provide at least a start
toward reconstruction of the sophism—viz.
... is other than Socrates.
Socrates is (a) man.
.*• • • • is other than man.
But what is the implicit subject of the first premiss and
the conclusion? There seem to be two possibilities.
Some have taken the subject to be ’man'. Thus,
on this view, the second diversity paradox is this:
(1) Man is other than Socrates.
(2) Socrates is (a) man.
(3) Man is other than man. 26
Most, however, have assumed that the subject is ’Coriscus’.
And, consequently, they have taken the argument to be
(1) Coriscus is other than Socrates.
(2) Socrates is (a) man.
.*.(3) Coriscus is other than man. 27
26According to Peterson, the author of [Alexandri
]
in Llbros Elenchorum
,
Vo 1 . II of Commentarla In Aristotelem
Graeca (39, 33-40 , 2) and "the anonymous paraphrast"
(Sophonias
,
Vol. XXIII of Comm. Graeca ), understood the
argument in this way.
27peterson lists, as supporters of this version of
the argument, Poste, Tricot, Pickard-Cambridge
,
Forster , Ross
,
and Pseudo-Scotus . However, we can add to this list Hamblin
and the authors of the Glose in Arist. Soph. El. (De Rijk,
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Again, unfortunately, there seem to be no textual
clues sufficient to resolve this issue beyond doubt. How-
ever, I am inclined to think that, since 'Coriscus' is
the subject of the remarks immediately preceding the pre-
sentation of the second diversity paradox, it is perhaps
more natural to suppose that the unstated subject in that
paradox is the same—i.e. 'Coriscus'. Nevertheless,
later, in my discussion of Aristotle's solution to the
second diversity paradox, I shall take account of both
readings
.
A Further Comment on the Second Reading; of the
Second Diversity Paradox . Although I tend to favor the
second reading of the second diversity paradox over the
first reading, there is a feature of that version that
should perhaps be noted. It will be recalled that the
first premiss of the first diversity paradox is
o Kopec- ko 5 erepov «v0pc6rrou
But if 'Coriscus'— 'o Kopio-Ko^'-— is taken to be the
implicit subject of the second diversity paradox, then the
conclusion of that paradox appears to be the same as the
p. 216) and the Summa Sophist icorum Elencorum (De Rijk,
p. 356). Perhaps"^ too
,
William of Sherwood revealed his sym-
pathy for this second version of the argument when he stated
the parallel example,
a Sorte est Plato alter.
Sortes est homo.
Ergo ab homine est Plato alter.
( Introduct ion to Logic , tr. Norman Kretzmann, p. 150)
first premiss of the first diversity paradox. Yet aren’t
the premisses of these paradoxes supposed to be true, and
the conclusions false?
As stated earlier, it seems to me that what is
intended by the first premiss of the first diversity
paradox is either that Coriscus is other than the species
man or that Coriscus is other than some man; and both of
these propositions are plainly true. Yet, since the
conclusion of the second diversity paradox is presumably
taken to be false, the sentence in question must have at
least one other reading. Is there, then, an alternative
interpretation on which it is false?
In Plato’s Euthydemus
,
there is a delightful
passage that deals with the hazards of ’sfeoo^’.
Socrates is being subjected to a classic piece of sophistry
by Dionysodorus
:
Then, said [Dionysodorus], Chaeredemus was other than
the father?
Than mine, I said.
Then was a father being other than a father? Are you
the same as the stone?
I'm afraid you may prove me so, I said, but I don’t
think I am.
Then you are other than the stone? said he.
Other to be sure, said I.
Then being other than a stone, said he, you are not
a stone? And being other than gold you are not gold.
That is all true.
So then Chaeredemus, he said, being other than a
father, would not be a father.
It seems, I said, that he is not a father.
Euthydemus now chimed in: I suppose if Chaeredemus is a
father, Sophroniscus again being other than a father
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is not a father, so that you, Socrates arefatherless
.
The point of interest here, of course, is the play on
sentences of the form 'x is other than (an) F'
. When
Socrates allows that Chaeredemus is other than a father,
he means that Chaeredemus is not his father. Yet, as
the discussion continues, Socrates is led to accept the
stronger—and false—proposition that Chaeredemus is not a
father at all—i.e. that Chaeredemus is other than each and
every father.
Returning, then, to the second diversity paradox,
we were looking for a reading of
o • KopCcn<o^ exapov oivOjOojttou
on which it might be regarded as false. The Euthydemus
passage suggests one. There it is made clear that, in some
cases
,
. . . is other than (an) F
might be understood as
. . . is not (an) F
or
. . . is other than (each and every) F.
Hence,
Coriscus is other than (a) man
2®Plato, Euthydemus
,
298a, tr. W. H. D. Rouse, in
The Collected Dialogues of Plato (including the Letters),
ed . EL Hamilton and H. Cairns
,
(Hew York: Random House Inc.,
1961), pp. 385-420.
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might be taken to mean
Coriscus is not (a) man
or
Coriscus is other than (each and every) man.
Thus, just as there are readings of
° ^Op'-O'JKO^ E.'C £.po\> cKvOpCOTTOU
on which it is true, and, as a result, might qualify as a
premiss of a paradox, so there is at least one reading on
which it is absurd, and hence might serve as the conclusion
of a paradox.
The Possessive Paradoxes
In addition to the epistemic and diversity
sophisms, Aristotle's list of paradoxes of accidence in-
cludes a number of examples whose key terms include
possessive adjectives. Following Peterson, I shall call
these sophisms "the possessive paradoxes."
The "Is the dog your father?" At SE 179a35, Aris-
totle refers to the "cxo^ o kuojv rrc<f'p|0 ;" sophism. The
allusion is, undoubtedly, to an argument to be found in
Plato's Euthvdemus . The sophist, Dionysodorus
,
is
speaking
:
Just tell me [Ctesippus], have you a dog?
Yes, and a very bad one, said Ctesippus.
Has he got puppies?
Very much so, he said, as bad as he is.
Then the dog is their father?
I have seen him myself, he said, on the job with the
bitch
.
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Very well, isn’t the dog yours?
Certainly, he said.
ySu?
hS 13 y°UrS
’
S ° the d0g beoomes
(298d-4)
The sophist's argument, in essence, seems to be this:
(1) The dog is your own.
(2) The dog is a father.
(3) The dog is your own father. 30
And, in fact, although Aristotle’s allusion to the argument
at SE 179a35 is suggestive of only the conclusion, at
179bl4-15 he refers to the argument again, this time by
actually mentioning the premisses: " cl c&e iarl
iTc<T'jp ) ecrr c St o'S’p . ”
In view of these considerations, then, there seems
to be little room for disagreement over the formulation of
the "Is the dog your father?" Certainly Buridan,31
Forster, 32 Pcste,33 and ?seudo-Scotus34 present the argument
2 9The translation is W. H. D. Rouse's (in The
Collected Dialogues of Plato
,
ed . Hamilton and Cairns )
.
3°I have introduced the expression, ’your own',
because it—unlike simply ’your’—can be used' in both (1)
and (3). (i.e. 'your own'—unlike 'your'—can both stand
alone (as in (1)), and be used to precede a general term
(as in (3)). In this respect, 'your own' more closely re-
sembles the Greek, ' <r 6^'.
31<John Buridan, Sophisms on Meaning and Truth
,
translated and with an introduction by T. K. Scott (New York
Appleton-Century-Crofts
,
19 66), p. 121.
32Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations
,
tr. E. S.
Forster (Loeb ed.), p. 122 fn. (a).
33Edward Poste, op . clt
.
, p. 73-
3^John Duns Scotus, op . cit . , Ch. XXIV.
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in much the same way as I have. However, some have sug-
gested a different statement of the argument. For example,
Hamblin, at one point, offers the following formulation:
(1) The do
,
5
is yours.
(2) The dog is a father.
.*.(3) The father is yours. 35
And, in fact, in his first statement of the paradox, Joseph
does the same. 36
The difference between the latter version and the
former may, at first glance, seem slight. But when I come
to discuss Aristotle's solution to the possessive para-
doxes, I shall try to show that there are convincing rea-
sons for preferring the former, more literal version.
The "Is the statue your work?" The "... o
crov icrrtv sppov . . .
"; ("Is the statue your
work?") SE 1793. 3 ^, is simply a variation of the "Is the dog
your father?"
The way the sophism was thought to proceed is sug-
gested by Aristotle's remarks at 179b4-6:
> C, > ^ , ’ v , * ' 1/ f
,
. . . OUO £,(. TOUT’ £crTlv' cpiov, 8CTXC
Zpyov, epov £o-ccv’
. . .
(. . . nor if this is my own, and this is a work, is
it my own work . .
.
)
Assuming that 'rout”, here, refers to the statue (o
? C \ .
) , the argument, then, seems to be this:
35c, L. Hamblin, op . cit
.
,
p. 86 .
36 H. W. B. Joseph, op . cit
. , p. 587.
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vl) - The statue is my own.
.rol m^
e Sta ^ ue is (a) work.
The statue is my own work.
Again, the worriesome conclusion results from
combining a possessive adjective—this time '^ov
(
. ny
own-) instead of ' cr£v (-your own')-with an expression-
in this case, ' tpyov (
-work- )—that is predicated
(truly) of the subject.
The "Is this your child?" Finally, at l80a5-8,
Aristotle provides one further example of a possessive
paradox of accidence.
The text is this:
ecr-rc Toutg crov
;
voa
. eerxt tou xo tckvov;
crov apex. XouXo Te.xv'ov o-cc. croup Lar)K£.\> OkVcx
, c kcx\ crov
T£,KVOv;
,
oc' o OU CoV X&KVOV,
.(Is this your own? Yes. And is this a child? Thenyour own [is] this child; because it hapoens to be
both your own and a child, but it is not’ your own
child. )
The Questions, *
. . .
ecrx <. xouxo cre v ’
; (’Is this your
own?’) and 1 e.o"c c . . . xouxo tskvov’; (’Is this a child?’)
presumably indicate the premisses of the sophism:
(1) Thi s is your own.
(2) This is a child.
And, taking account of the remark, "... 0u crov
t£kvov," it seems clear that the inference to which Aris-
totle is objecting is from (1) and (2) to
(3) This is your own child.
Thus, the form of the "Is this your own child?" is the same
as that of the other "possessive paradoxes."
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However, in presenting the "Is this your child?"
Aristotle makes some further remarks that are perhaps
worth noting at this point. In the previous paragraph,
I claimed that Aristotle objects to the inference from (1)
and (2) to (3). Not all agree with this. For example, in
translating the section quoted above, E. S. Forster ex-
presses Aristotle's view as follows:
’Is A yours?' 'Yes'. 'Is A a child?’ 'Yes’. 'Then
A is your child', for he happens to be both yours and
a. child; but for all that he is net 'your child' .37
Here Forster suggests that Aristotle's view is that whereas
'A is your child' follows from 'A is yours' and 'A is a
child', 'A is "your child"' does not. I take Forster's
use of quotation marks around the second occurrence of
'your child' in this passage to indicate that he thinks
that we must be careful to distinguish between two differ-
ent senses of that expression-i . e . 'your child' is, as
Forster interprets Aristotle, ambiguous. One sense is
such that 'A is your child' does follow from the premisses
in question; the other is such that it does not.
But it seems to me that Forster's translation mis-
represents Aristotle's view on this matter. In 179b38ff
.
,
Aristotle in fact mentions that some attempt to solve the
possessive paradoxes by appealing to the notion of ambi-
guity. Yet he goes on to state that "... no one says,
3?Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations , tr. E. S.
Forster (Loeb ed
. ) , p. 125.
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properly, 38 that this is so-and-so's child, if so-and-so
is [e.g.,] master of the child.
. . This suggests
that Aristotle is of the opinion that 'A is B's child',
has a single sense
—
presumably that sense in which it is
true just in case A was conceived by B.39
Nevertheless, Aristotle does seem to endorse the
inference from (1) and (2) to
O-OV . .
. TOUTO t^KVOV.
How are we to explain this? I suspect that the explanation
is simply that this sentence ought not to be translated as
Forster translates it—i.e.
(3) This is your child.
Rather, we should translate it as
(4) This child is yours.
That there is an important difference between
sentences such as (3) and (4) will be brought out in a
later chapter.^ 0 But, for now, I hope simply to have said
3^The entire passage in question is this:
Some also solve these reasonings, e.g. that this is
your father, or [that this is your] son, or [that this
is your] slave, by invoking the notion of ambiguity.
Yet it is clear that if the refutation depends upon many
meanings [literally, 'being said in many ways'] the term
or expressions ought to have several proper meanings
[literally 'ought to be said properly in several ways'];
but no one says, properly, that this is so-and-so's
child, if so-and-so is [e.g.] master of the child; but
the combination depends upon the accident [i.e. 'depends
upon the application of the fallacious principle of
accidence
'
]
.
^Chapter V, l42ff.
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enough to convince the reader that Aristotle would not
have been sympathetic to the suggestion, raised by
Forster's translation, that one appropriate response to
the "Is this your child?" might be to allow that, on one
interpretation of (3), the argument is valid.
The "Is a Few Taken a Few Times a Few?"
The last example on Aristotle's list at SE 179a
33ff. is referred to as the " re* oA 1^ k<5 b'Xtyoi
oA^tx; Unfortunately, however, there are no further
remarks in the text specifically about this paradox. Nor,
as far as I have been able to determine, is this example
even mentioned in any other classical texts. Hence, as
Hamblin says, "any explanation [of the "Is a few taken a
few times a few?"] must be quite conj ectural . "^2
Nevertheless, there have been two relatively re-
cent attempts to formulate this sophism. Poste, in his
notes on De Sophisticis Elenchis XXIV, calls the argument
an "excentric syllogism. "^3 According to him, it goes
like this:
(1) A four multiplied by a four is a large number.
(2) A four multiplied by a four is a four.
^SE 179a35.
L. Hamblin, op . cit
.
,
p. 86.
^3Edward Poste, op . cit .
,
p. 156.
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;.(3) A four is a large number. ^
And the other attempt to formulate the "Is a few taken a
few times a few?" that I have tracked down is to be found
in Joseph's An_Int roductlon to Logic
. Joseph takes the
argument to be this:
(1) Six is few.
(2) Thirty-six is six times six.
.'.(3) Thirty-six is few. ^5
Later, in Chapter V, I shall comment on each of
these versions
. It will be shown that there are compelling
reasons to doubt thao either is a satisfactory reconstruc-
tion of the argument that Aristotle had in mind. Following
that, however, I shall propose my own version of the argu-
ment-—one which, I believe, comes considerably closer to
what Aristotle intended.
* # #
This, then, concludes my presentation of Aris-
totle’s list of paradoxes of accidence. No doubt, they
seem to comprise a rather diverse collection. But in
^ Ibid
. , p. 73. Poste suggests that the example
is comparable to arguments such as
(a) Oxygen combined with hydrogen is water.
Oxygen combined with hydrogen is oxygen.
/.Oxygen is water,
and
(b) Oxygen is gaseous.
Oxygen combined with hydrogen is oxygen.
/.Oxygen combined with hydrogen is gaseous.
Of course, (a) is closer to Poste’s version of the "Is a
few taken a few times a few?" than (b).
^5h. W. B. Joseph, op.cit., p. 587.
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order to understand what they may have appeared to
Aristotle to have in common, we must examine more care-
fully the feature that he claims they share—that of being
examples of the fallacy of accidence.
CHAPTER III
THE FALLACY OF ACCIDENCE
55
Aristotle's Characterization of the Fallacy of Accidence
1
According to Edward Poste, "The fallacy per acci-
dens [i.e. the fallacy of accidence] has been generally mis-
understood, which seems to show that it is an ill-defined
species." 1 I am inclined to agree that there is quite a
history of misunderstanding about the fallacy of accidence;
but I am not sure that it is entirely fair to say that this
shows that the fallacy of accidence is an "ill-defined
species." At least, it seems to me that Aristotle does try
to provide a formulation of the faulty principle on which
arguments from accidence depend. Admittedly, some of the
terminology in which that principle is couched is not as
clear as we might like it to be. This, however, is not so
much a problem with the fallacy of accidence itself, as a
difficulty that pervades the entire Aristotelian corpus.
How does Aristotle attempt to characterize the
fallacy of accidence? Consider his first statement about
arguments from accidence in De Sophisticis Elenchis :
Fallacious arguments from accidence arise whenever it
is claimed that everything belongs in the same way
both to the subject and to its accidents. (l66b28ff.)
The suggestion, here, is that the fallacy of accidence is
^Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies or t he
Sophlstici Elenchi (London: Macmillan and Co., 1866), p. 158.
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committed by any argument that invokes, in the justifica-
tion of some step of the argument, a certain rule or
principle, viz.,
(1)
?I®r
yth
i
n
f
b ® l0nS5 in the same way to the sub-ject and to its accidents.
Thus we have at least a sufficient condition for commission
oi the fallacy of accidence: an argument. A, commits the
fallacy of accidence if, in justification of some step of
the argument, (1) is invoked. But does Aristotle provide
us tfj.th any indication of what the necessary conditions are
for committing the fallacy of accidence?
In his opening remarks on solving paradoxes of
accidence. Aristotle says
With respect to arguments from accidence, one and the
same solution [suffices] for all. For, since it is
undetermined whether that which is said belongs to thesuoject whenever it belongs to the accident, and sincein some cases it is thought to and said to, but in
others this is said to be not necessary, we ought,
therefore, in all cases alike, when a conclusion hasbeen reached, say that it is not necessary. (179a
26ff.)
The fact that Aristotle says that all arguments guilty of
the fallacy of accidence can be refuted in the same way
seems to be an indication that he thinks that there is
some fault that they all have in common. An attempt to
specify that fault is to be found in the second sentence
of the above-quoted passage. Arguments from accidence, we
are told, are to be refuted by pointing out that "... it
is undetermined whether that which is said belongs to the
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subject whenever it belongs to the accident," or, in
other words, by rejecting the rule or principle
(2) A thing is said of a subject whenever it belongsto its accident. b
One might be inclined to think, at this point, that
(1) and (2) simply say the same thing. And, if one were
to suppose so, one would be in a position to maintain that
not only does every argument that invokes (1) commit the
fallacy ol accidence, but (since every argument that com-
mits the fallacy of accidence appeals to (2), and (2) is
thought to be synonymous with (1)) every argument that
commits the fallacy of accidence invokes (1). In short,
invoking (1) is both a necessary and sufficient condition
for committing the fallacy of accidence.
But closer inspection reveals an important differ-
ence between vl) and (2). Whereas (1) seems to require
that everything that belongs to a given subject belongs to
its accidents, and conversely
, (2) requires only that
everything that belongs to the accidents of the subject,
belongs to the subject. To put the point in another way,
a natural rewrite of (1) seems to be
(1)
' If x is a subject, and y is an accident of x,
then (z)(z belongs to x if and only if z belongs
to y).
However, (2) is most naturally read as simply
(2)
' If x is a subject, and y is an accident of x,
then (z)(z belongs to x if z belongs to y).
Thus while (1) goes over into a conditional whose consequent
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is a biconditional, (2) translates into a conditional
whose consequent is, itself, simply a conditional .
2
The question arises, then, whether Aristotle wants
to characterize the fallacy of accidence in terms of (i).
or just (2) ? . SE 166 d 28-30 suggests that Aristotle has in
mind (1)*. But the warning at 179a26ff. is directed
simply against (2)'. Is there any decisive consideration
that might help us to resolve this matter? I think there
is
.
My own view is that Aristotle is simply not as
precise as he should have been at 179a26ff. In that
passage, just before he states the principle, (2), Aris-
totle claims that all arguments from accidence can be re-
futed in the same way—namely, by rejecting (2). But, as
be made clear in a later chapter, there are some
arguments from accidence that do not make use of (2), al-
though they do invoke the principle
(3) If x is a subject, and y is an accident of x,
then (z)(z belongs to x only if z belongs to y).3
In light of this, it seems to me that what Aristotle should
have said at 179a26ff. is not that all arguments from acci-
dence are to be refuted by rejecting (2), but that they are
2The difference that I am trying to bring out here
is, I believe, evident, not only in my translation of the
relevant passages, but also in the translations of Forster
and Pickard-Cambridge
.
3 See, especially. Chapter V.
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to be refuted by rejecting either (2) or (3).
In other words, invoking (2) is not a necessary
condition for committing the fallacy of accidence. But
invoking either (2) or (3) is. That is, an argument
commits the fallacy of accidence only if it invokes
either (2) or (3). And since—as the examples in De
Sophisticis Elenchis also show— it is clear that Aristotle
thinks that invoking either (2) or (3) is a sufficient
condition for committing the fallacy of accidence, the
appeal to (2) or (3) constitutes both the necessary and
sufficient conditions for committing the fallacy. To put
it more precisely, the view that I am ascribing to Aris-
totle is this:
An argument, A, commits the fallacy of accidence if
and only if A invokes either the principle (i) if x
is a subject, and y is an accident of x, then
( z ) (
z
belongs to x if z belongs to y), or the prin-
ciple (ii) if x is a subject, and y is an accident
of x, then (z)(z belongs to x only if z belongs to y).
We have thus taken a small step towards under-
standing the "ill-defined" fallacy of accidence. What we
must tackle next are the semantic aspects of the prin-
ciples (i) and (ii; above. In particular, we must investi-
gate the meaning of the expression ' cru^^
*
('accident’) as it occurs in this context. Before I take
up that matter, however, let me make some brief remarks
about the other two key terms involved—viz. 'subject' and
and 'belongs to'
.
Perhaps the only point that need be made about the
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use of the word ’subject’ (Aristotle's ' iT|Ocx ) in
principles (i) and (ii) is that it designates things
--not
linguistic entities. 11 Among the things to which ’subject'
applies here are, for example, the designata of such terms
as 'KopCcrKO^ ’ ( ’Coriscus
' ) , ’ £ <*v<Sp^ ’ (’the statue’),
and 'o Kuojv ’ ('the dog'). In fact, after examining
Aristotle's various examples of arguments from accidence,
it will be clear that the subject, in each case, is some-
th 11^ that he Aristotle—would most likely classify as a
primary substance.
The expression 'belongs to' (
’ urr^o^ gu v ' ) is
somewhat more troublesome. But let me make one or two re-
marks to indicate roughly how I propose to treat the term.
W. and M. Kr.eale note, in The Development of Logic
,
that Aristotle seems to regard certain ' urr v » (’be-
longs to’) sentences as interchangeable with a number of
other kinds of sentences in which that verb does not
appear. More specifically, according to the Kneales,
It seems clear [especially in the Prior Analytics
,
with which the Kneales are primarily concerned at this
point] that the following four forms are regarded as
equivalent
:
(1) A is predicated of B.
(2) A belongs to B.
( 3 ) B is A.
l In fact, ' TCjoScy'ptc*' translates, literally, as
' thing’
.
6l
(^) B is in A as in a whole. 5 "
The claim that Aristotle treats certain (y
»
sentences as interchangeable with other kinds of sentences
seems to me to be further substantiated by the De Sophisti-
ci-S Elenchis
. For in his discussion of the fallacy of
accidence, Aristotle does make use of at least two other
ways of saying what he elsewhere expresses by ’ urrcyo^'e.t v»
For example, consider SE 179a28, where Aristotle is
warning against the sophist’s principle (i). There, in-
stead of speaking of "that which belongs to" the subject
(as he does earlier at l66b29-30), Aristotle uses the
expression 'to . . . ackt£o v’— "that which is said of"
the subject. Thus
. . . belongs to
and
. . . is said of
seem to be interchangeable here. And a little further on
from 179a28, after citing a number of examples of argu-
ments from accidence, Aristotle says
cpcxvepov yap e.v orrvcxcri. fouroc^ ore oox c<vo<yKTj
TO KoOTcx ToO 0-uy.p,e.prjKOTo^ Kcxl Kc<xk tou -TTpoc ypcx'Ca^
oihrjQsoccrOc<c *
(It is clear in all these cases [i.e., in the counter-
examples just mentioned] that it is not necessary that
the attribute be true of the accident and the subject.)
(179a36ff.
)
5w. and M. Kneale
,
The Development of Logic
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p . 62
.
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Here, instead of ’ irrao^cv '
,
Aristotle introduces the
verb ’»>i^0£o£<r5« c '__. to be true of ,
_ So
• . . belongs to
is apparently also taken to be interchangeable with
• . . is true of
.
But, given that the expression ’belongs to' is
interchangeable here with these other expressions, are we
any closer to understanding what it means to say that some-
thing 'belongs to 1, something else. In this Aristotelian
sense? Since ’belongs to’ can be read as ’is true of',
one might suppose that the relation in question is one
that might be mere intelligibly expressed as 'is an attri-
bute of’. This view is encouraged by translations that
explicitly insert that it is "attributes" that may properly
be said to "belong to” subjects and accidents. 6 An ad-
vantage of such an interpretation is that "belonging to"
turns out to be a somewhat familiar relation. But here
a note of caution should also be expressed.
To hold that the relation expressed by 'belongs
to' is the same as the relation expressed by ’is an attri-
bute of’ is to restrict substitution on ' . . . ' in
'
. . . belongs to ’ to expressions that designate
attributes. However, one should not think that this limits
the substituends for ’...’, to abstract singular terms
^Among such translations are those of Forster,
Pickard-Cambridge
,
and Poste.
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such as
-whiteness',
-manhood-, etc;- One should keep in
mind that Aristotle finds it natural to say such things as
belongs to Socrates
and
man belongs to Coriscus.7
Of course, adjectives such as ’white' and substantives
such as ’man’ may seem like strange attribute-designators.
But the point is that if we want to read (as I shall)
'belongs to’ as 'is an attribute of', we must, then, be
prepared to accept them as such.
With these few cursory remarks on 'subject' and
'belongs to', let me turn now to a somewhat fuller con-
sideration of the third key term in principles (i) and
)
—
' crufxjzza rj ko^ ' ( ' accident
' ) .
The Sense of oV in De Sophist. lcis Elenchis:
Some Suggestions
Aristotle's sophist, as was pointed out in the pre-
vious section, makes use of both the principle
(i) If x is a subject, and y is an accident of x,
then (z)(z belongs to x if z belongs to y)
and the principle
(ii) If x is a subject, and y is an accident of x, then
(z)(z belongs to x only if z belongs to y).
^G. E. L. Owen makes this point in "The Platonism of
Aristotle," Proceedings of the British Academy
,
LI, (1965) p.
157: "If I say 'Socrates is old' or 'Socrates is a man',
what I predicate of Socrates on Aristotle's view is not old
age or manhood but simply old or man—or, in English, a man .
"
(The underlining merely indicates Owen's emphases.)
In short, he is committed to what was earlier labelled
"(1)" (or "(1) '
") but what I shall from hereon call "the
principle of accidence," or simply "PA":
PA:
then
s
^
b J ect > and y is an accident of xerWzXz belongs to x if and only if z beings
The question I want to consider in the next two sections
is What is meant by 'is an accident of' here?" In this
section I shall consider some possibilities that turn out,
for various reasons, to be unsatisfactory. An attempt will
then be made in the following section to provide an account
that I think comes closer to the truth.
What sorts of things does Aristotle include among
accidents of SE? It will become clear, when we consider
his examples of arguments from accidence, that Aristotle
wants to say such things as
(1) Father is an accident of this dog.
C2; Man is an accident of Socrates.
(3) The one approaching is an accident of Coriscus.
That is, among accidents of various subjects (in the SE
sense of 'accident'), Aristotle counts such diverse sorts
of entities as father, man, and the one approaching. 8 So
an adequate account of the meaning of 'crujupzprj K oj
'
must
at least be such that it allows sentences such as (1) -
(3) to be true.
As a first attempt at determining the appropriate
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sense of 'accident' (or 'is an accident of') here, it
seems reasonable to consider what Aristotle says about
accidents in Topics
. I say "it seems reasonable" because
SE is traditionally regarded as an appendix of Topics,.
9
One might suppose, in view of this, that the sense of
'cru^.as^Ko/ specified in the latter treatise might well
have been carried over into SE.
In the opening book of Topics
, Aristotle sets out
to distinguish between four different kinds of "predi-
cables' definition, property, genus, and accident. And
at 102b4 we are given two accounts of what an accident
is
:
An accident is (1) something which
,
though it is none
of the foregoing— i.e. neither a definition nor aproperty nor a genus
—
yet belongs to the thing: (2)
something which may possibly either belong or not be-long to any one and the self-same thing ....
Of these two accounts, Aristotle thinks the latter is the
better; for, with respect to the first, "one is bound, if
he is to understand it, to know already what definition and
genus and property are, whereas the second is sufficient of
9see, for example E. S. Forster's introduction to
his translation of De Sophisticis Elenchis :
Both the Topics and the De Sophisticis Elenchis have
always been regarded as genuine works of Aristotle.
The two treatises are closely connected; the De So-
phisticis Elenchis is an appendix to the Topics and
its final section forms an epilogue to both treatises;
indeed Aristotle himself seems sometimes to regard the
two as forming a single work, since he twice quotes the
De Sophisticis Elenchis under the title of Topics .
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Itself to tell us the essential meaning of the term In
question . "10
Perhaps the first thing that strikes one on ex-
amining these two accounts of ’accident’ is that they are
not equivalent. For, according to the first, an accident
is something which "belongs to" a given thing; but no such
condition is expressed in the second account. It is clear,
however, on further examination of Topics that Aristotle
does intend this condition to be understood." 11
What, then, according to the more informative of
the two Topics accounts, is an accident? It seems to me
that what is intended is at least something like this:
(Al) y is an accident of x iff (i) y belongs to x,
and
( 11 ) o ~ (y belongs
to x ) ,-12
Thus, to use two of Aristotle’s favorite examples, sitting
is an accident of a given individual--say
,
Socrates
—
just
in case
(i) sitting belongs to Socrates, and
(ii) O ~ (sitting belongs to Socrates).
And white is an accident of e.g. Cleon provided that
^Topics 102bl0-l4. Both this quotation and the
previous one are from Pickard-Cambridge
' s translation.
11See
,
especially, Topics 103bl8-19.
12 I use the symbol, 'O’, here, to stand for
Aristotle’s ’ ’ (’it is possible (that)’). For
the moment, I shall leave this notion of "possibility"
unexplicated
.
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white belongs to Cleon, andUi; %> ~ (white belongs to Cleon).
But does the Topics account of ' cru
—
i.e. (Al)— capture all the examples listed earlier of
accidents mentioned in SE? It seems to me that although
(1) Father is an accident of this dog
may pass the test, both
(2) Man is an accident of Socrates
and
(3) The one approaching is an accident of Coriscus
raise problems. But the problems raised by (3) are con-
siderably different from those raised by (2). So I shall
defer consideration of the former for the moment. Let us
first devote our attention to (2).
Man or even being a man—simply does not seem to
be an appropriate candidate for an accident of Socrates.
It is true that Aristotle allows that man does, in a certain
way, "belong to" a particular man—e.g. Coriscus. 13 So man
may be said to satisfy the first condition of the Topics
criterion. But what about the second condition? Is it
possible for man not to belong to Socrates? That it should
be possible seems most un-Aristotelian. Surely, as Aris-
totle views things, if there is anything that "belongs to"
Socrates that cannot cease to belong to him (at least, as
long as he exists), it is that! Hence, one might conclude
13see Metaphysics 1015b28ff.
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that, in those passages where Aristotle claims that man
Is an accident of a given individual, he must surely have
in mind some criterion other than (Al).l^
It is this example in particular— i . e
. (2)—that
has led commentators to suggest somewhat "looser" accounts
of Aristotle's use of ' croppy in SE. Thus, for
example, C. L. Hamblin proposes that Aristotle is here
using 'au|A 0 £^r,KO 5 ' "for any property of a thing that is
not convertible with it. "15 what
,
more precisely, does
Hamblin have in mind? In his words, "'man’ is an accident
of 'Socrates’ because although Socrates is a man not every
man is Socrates.
There seems to be a rather flagrant abuse of the
use-mention' distinction here. However, Hamblin’s point
seems to be that what 'wQ ' designates is an accident
of what ’XcJK/oarrjy » designates just in case
Z lOK|Oo<Tl^ 5 o<\>OpoJTTo<,
(Socrates (is a) man)
is true, but
(Man (is) Socrates)
li4 I do not mean to suggest that such a conclusion
would necessarily be correct. Perhaps (Al) can be inter-
preted—as I shall suggest, shortly—in such a way that it
allows that man is an accident of a given individual.
15C. L. Hamblin, Fallacies (London: Methuen and
Co., 1970), p. 85.
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Is false. That is to say, the expressions 'Sv^no;' and
jLcoxp »vT7j
^
' are not convertible.
This suggests the following criterion of accidence:
(A2) rp is an accident of c*-1 is true iff (i)is true, but (ii) y is is false.
r
o< isp*
(A2) does seem to have the advantage of including man among
the accidents of Socrates, while retaining father, too, as
an accident of this dog. Moreover, there is some textual
basis for the view that Aristotle links the concept of
accidence (at least in one sense of 'accidence') with the
concept of non-convertibility. 1 ® However, the difficulty
for this view arises from the fact that in SE Aristotle
wants to say that the (one) approaching ( To itootnov) is
an accident of Coriseus. But of course 'the one approach-
ing’ and 'Coriseus' seem to be convertible. So, on (A2),
we cannot account for
(3) The one approaching is an accident of Coriseus.
Another attempt to specify the sense of ' crujj.pzprjKop1
in SE is to be found in S. L. Peterson's The Masker Parad ox.
There Peterson says.
It should be observed that the sense of 'accident'
in 'fallacy of accident', as Aristotle's examples
show, and as the commentators agree, is just 'any-
thing predicated' or 'anything that holds of something',
or maybe, 'anything that it falls to something to be. ^17
^Topics 103b7ff.
17 S. L. Peterson, The Masker Paradox (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton, 1969), p. 76.
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Unfortunately, Peterson does not give' us any help on how
we are to understand the expressions 'anything predicated',
'anything that holds of something' and 'anything that it
falls to something to be'. But on one possible reading,
these phrases might be taken to suggest that we should
count as an accident of a given subject designated by <*,
anything designated by any expression
,
/3 , that can be
truly predicated of ex'. In other words, Peterson's cri-
terion might be formulated more precisely as follows:
(A3) r y6 is an accident of op is true iff is a
is true. '
(A3) has a certain attraction. On this criterion,
all three of our examples from SE—father, man, and the one
approaching turn out to be accidents of their respective
subjects. However, in admitting these examples that we
want, (A3) seems to open the way to a number of other
examples that I am inclined to think Aristotle would want
to exclude. In particular, I do not think— for reasons I
shall offer in the next section—that Aristotle would want
to allow the SE sense of 'aruy.ps.prf ko^' to extend to the
following
:
(4) Rational animal is an accident of man
(5) Socrates is an accident of Socrates
Yet, on (A3), (*0 and (5) seem to be true.
Thus, while (A3) appears to be a weak enough cri-
terion to include the relevant kinds of examples of acci-
dents in SE, the objection that I shall try to make good
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on a little later is that it is too weak.
Finally, before turning to my own suggestion about
Aristotle's use of ' crupp^Koj' In SE, I want to consider
one more rather interesting proposal that Is suggested by
some remarks in a paper by Nicholas P. White— "Origins
of Aristotle’s Essentialism. "18 At one point in his paper,
White reminds us of a thesis proposed by Jaakko Hintikka
that according to Aristotle, a statement is necessary if
and only if it is true at all times. "19 I, like White,
find this suggestion rather attractive. And, as White
points out, one who is inclined to adopt it might well con-
clude that Aristotle would be "unwilling to accept as true
any statement of the form 'Necessarily (A is F)’ where 'A'
designates a sensible particular which is perishable."
"For," as White continues, "he [i.e. Aristotle] suggests at
one place at least that, e.g., when Socrates is not in
existence, no affirmative statement about Socrates is true.
He might therefore be unwilling on this score to say that
Socrates is necessarily a man. "20
l^Nicholas P. White, "’Origins of Aristotle's
Essentialism," The Review of Metaphysics, (September,
1972), p. 62.
!9For Hintikka 's development of this thesis, see his
papers "Necessity, Universality, and Time in Aristotle,"
Ajatus
,
XX (1957), pp. 65-90; "The Once and Future Sea
Fight," The Philosophical Review
,
LXXIII, No. 4 (1964) pp
.
461—492
;
"Time, Truth, and Knowledge in Ancient Greek
Philosophy," American Philosophical Quarterly
,
VI, No. 1
(1967) pp. 1-14
.
2C*White, op . cit
.
,
p. 62.
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• These remarks suggest a way of understanding our
original criterion of accidence from Topics— i.e. (Al)
in such a way as to accommodate the view that man is an
accident of Socrates.
Consider
(A4) /3'is an accident of c* 1 is true at tl iff
/? wr73 is true at t;i > and(ii) (3t )( r~ ( cx is p )
n
is true at t).
Given that there is a time, tl, such that ’This dog is a
father is true at tl, and a time t2, such that ' ^ (This
dog is a father)’ is true at t2 (and that would include any
time that the designatum of 'this dog' fails to exist), it
follows that ’Father is an accident of this dog' is true at
tl. And now, since 'Socrates is a man' was true in M 5 0 B.C.,
and yet there was a time—e.g. 500 B.C.—when ' ~ (Socrates
is a man)' was true (again, any time that Socrates failed
to exist would do), we can say that 'man is an accident of
Socrates' was true in 450 B.C.
Yet another benefit of (A4) seems to be that the
one approaching turns out to be an accident of Coriscus (at
certain times). For if 'Coriscus is the one approaching'
was true at 2.00 p.m., and its negation is true whenever
Coriscus does not exist or is not approaching, then—by
(A4)— 'The one approaching is an accident of Coriscus' was
true at 2.00 p.m.
Are there, then, any serious objections to (A4)?
Consider, again, the sentences
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(4) Rational animal is an accident of man
and
(5) Socrates is an accident of Socrates
One of the weaknesses of (A3)—for reasons as yet undis-
closed—was, I suggested, that it allowed such sentences
to be true. A happy consequence of (A4), however, is that
if we think of species (such as man) as being imperish-
able as Aristotle seems to do—then rational animal is, on
(A4), not an accident of man. The reason is, of course,
that the second condition of the criterion is unfulfilled.
But over against this advantage with regard to (4),
(A4) faces the same objection with respect to (5) as did
(A3). That is (A4)— like (A3)—admits Socrates as an acci-
dent of himself. Consider the sentences
(6) Socrates is Socrates.
Assuming that there is a time at which (6) is true, the
first condition of (A4) is satisfied. Is the second condi-
tion satisfied? Again, on the view that when Socrates
ceases to exist,—in White's words— "no affirmative state-
ment about him is true," there is a time when the negation
of (6) is true’ and, hence, the second condition is_ satis-
fied. Thus, on (A4),
(5) Socrates is an accident of Socrates
is true (at least, as long as 'Socrates is Socrates' is
true )
.
I have thus considered four attempts to state the
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truth conditions for the application of
ln SE ‘ N°ne seems fc0 me ^ be entirely satisfactory. Let
me turn, therefore, to a fifth and final proposal.
—
Final Suggestion About ' X rjKQ
y
»
In attempting to understand the use of » cru^eysrjKoj
»
in Aristotle's discussion of the fallacy of accidence, one
wonders with what concept (or concepts) Aristotle might be
contrasting it. The text, I think, tells us.
At SS l69b3-7 Aristotle attempts to explain how it
is that we come to be deceived by arguments from accidence.
In arguments from accidence," he says, "the deception
arises irom the inability to distinguish between the same
and the different, the one and the many,
. . .
.
" The sug-
gestion here is that, in an argument from accidence, two
terms are treated as designating one and the same thing,
when in fact they designate different things; or—as I
think Aristotle intends—things which are related only
accidentally.
We might take this passage, then, as a warning
against confusing the concepts of accidence and "sameness"
or oneness". In a later chapter, I shall try to develop
the contrast that I think Aristotle has in mind. But, for
the moment, let me return to the problem of formulating a
criterion of accidence.
It may be evident, now, why I found both (A3) and
75
(AH) unsatisfactory as accounts of wbat Aristotle intends
to include under the concept of o^cySe^Ko; in SE. Earlier,
I pointed out that on both (A3) and (A 4)
(5) Socrates is an accident of Socrates
turns out to be true. But this, I suggested, is unfortunate.
Now I am in a position to explain why I think so.
The reason why I think our criterion of accidence
should not allow sentences such as (5) to be true is simply
that, as l69b3-7 indicates, Aristotle wants to contrast
accidence with ’’sameness” (or "oneness”). Hence, since
Aristotle surely wants to hold that
Socrates is the same as Socrates
is true, he would presumably regard
Socrates is an accident of Socrates
as false . 21
At this point, a word should also be said about
(4) Rational animal is an accident of man
My reason for suggesting that our criterion should yield the
result that (4) is false is basically the same as that given
21 It is perhaps interesting to note that, ih the
Topics discussion of accidence, Aristotle makes the point,
explicitly, that 'is an accident of' is irreflexive. Warn-
ing against the tactics of the sophist, Aristotle says,
"look and see also if he has stated a thing to be an acci-
dent of itself, taking it' to be a different thing because it
has a different name, as Prodicus used to divide pleasure
into joy and delight and good cheer: for all these are names
of the same thing, to wit. Pleasure. If then anyone says
that joyfulness is an [accident] of cheerfulness, he would be
declaring it to be an [accident] of itself." Topics 112b21-
26 (tr. Pickard-Cambridge )
.
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in consideration of (5). Assuming that ’rational animal'
correctly defines 'man', it follows, on Aristotle's
account of definition in Topics
, that
Rational animal is the same as man
is true. 22 But, if 30
,
then—given that 'is an accident
of’ in SE is being contrasted with 'is the same as'— (4)
must be false on Aristotle’s view.
In view of these considerations, the following
criterion of accidence seems to me to come closer to what
Aristotle intends than those previously discussed:
(A5) r/S> is an accident of c*”1 is true iff
(i) rcy is is true and
(ii) 1* is the same as /p is not true. 2 3
/
On (A5), examples (1) and (2) come out as they
should. So do examples (4) and (5). However (3) may seem
to pose a problem. It will be recalled that Aristotle
22esp . Topics 152b 39: " . . . for if what is
signified by the term and by the expression be not the same,
clearly the expression rendered could not be a definition."
(tr. Pickard-Cambridge
)
2 3l should emphasize that (A5) is simply an attempt
to elucidate the concept of accidence that is to be found^
in De Sophisticis Elenchis . Aristotle undoubtedly uses
' crofA/s> s.fi,rjKo^ (and ' ve-c ' ) to mean different things
in different contexts. (Compare, for example. Topics with
Metaphysics A30. ) So by no means do I wish to claim that
TX57ir an adequate criterion for distinguishing between
everything that Aristotle ever treats as an accident and
everything that he ever treats as a non-accident.
It should also be observed, here, that the use of
the metalinguistic variables, ' c< ’ and ' /3 '
,
in (A5)—and,
in fact, throughout this dissertation— is such that they are
taken to range over not only singular terms (as is the common
practice), but also over general terms such as '(a) man’ and
'(a) few (taken a) few times'.
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wants to say that 'the one approaching' designates an
accident of Coriscus. There is no difficulty with condi-
tion (i) of (A5). (We assume that 'Coriscus is the one
approaching- is true at a given time.) But what about
condition (ii>? If 'The one approaching is an accident of
Coriscus' is to be true, then-by (A5)~'It is not the case
that the one approaching is the same as Coriscus' must be
true.
.et how can 'Coriscus is the one approaching' and
It is not the case that the one approaching is the same
as Coriscus’ both be true?
I think Aristotle has an answer to this last ques-
tion. But since it is a fairly substantial issue, I shall
delay discussion of it until a later chapter. 24
So far, then, I have tried to give an account of
what I take to be Aristotle's characterization of the
fallacy of accidence, and the use of ’ koj' that is
operative in his discussion of that fallacy. In the next
(and final) section of this chapter I want to return to the
indiscernibility and substitutivity interpretations of
Aristotle's solution to the Coriscus Puzzle to show how both
of these are unsatisfactory, given that my version of the
fallacious principle of accidence is correct.
24 See Chapter IV.
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The Fallacious Principle of Accident „n,i
Indlscernibility and Sub stltutivlty Interpref.al-.lnn*
Both the indiscernibillty interpretation and the
substltutivlty interpretation of Aristotle's solution to
the Corisous Puzzle identify the principle that Aristotle
is out to reject as "Leibniz' Law," although each intends
something different by this last expression.
White seems to think that Aristotle wants to give
up the principle
(x)(y)(if x = y then(F)(x has F iff y has F)).
I have already criticized the reasons that White offers in
defence of this claim. But now I am in a position to make
a further point. Assuming that my account (in the previous
sections) of the fallacious principle that Aristotle wants
to reject is correct, it is clear that Aristotle’s
abandonment of that principle by no means requires the
abandonment of White’s version of Leibniz’ Law. For denial
of PA would require the denial of White’s LL only if this
latter principle implied PA—which of course it does not.
The principle
(x)(y)(if x = y then(F)(x has F iff y has F))
plainly does not imply
PA: If x is a subject, and y is an accident of x,
then (z)(z belongs to x iff z belongs to y),
since there is no reason to suppose that what holds for
"identicals" must hold also for "accidentals" (i.e. things
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related "accidentally ")
—especially in view of the fact
that the truth of y is accidental to oP requires that
r<
* is the same as h"1 be not true. 2 5
The substitutivity interpretation, on the other
hand, takes the position that the principle that Aristotle
is concerned to reject is a principle about the inter-
changeability of co-designative expressions
—e.g.
Prom ^ and 0 c?] we may infer (birp where 5 and rare names and the formula <£>M is obtained from theformula Cp C5ZJ by replacing an occurrence of £ by tj.
But here, again, the question arises as to what such a
principle has to do with PA. To make a point analogous
to that of the last paragraph, if my ccnstrual of Aris-
totle’s use of ’ o-u^^)|Ko^ ’ in SE is correct, then one
wonders what a principle about expressions of the form
' has to do with one about expressions of the• • •
form ' is an accident of ’
.
In summary, it seems to me that the principle upon
which Aristotle thinks the various paradoxes of accidence
depend Is quite different from those candidates advocated
by the indiscernibility and the substitutivity interpreta-
2 5to put the point in another way, if the indis-
cernibility of identicals (logically) implied PA, then the
former would be inconsistent with the denial of the latter;
i.e., the following sentences would be mutually inconsis-
tent :
(i) (x ) (y ) (if x = y then (F)(Fx iff Fy))
(ii) (3x)(3y)(x is an accident of y . ~(F)(Fx iff Fy))
But, given my account of 'is an accident of', (i) and (ii)
are plainly consistent.
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tions. As I see it, Aristotle's rejection of the fal-
lacious principle in question leaves both White's and
Peterson's versions of Leibniz' Law untouched. But it
still remains, of course, to show precisely how my version
of the principle, PA, might have been thought by Aristotle
to be applicable to each of the examples mentioned in the
text
.
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CHAPTER IV .
the coriscus puzzle as a paradox op accidence
Aristotle's
_Solutlon to the Corlscus Pn^i^
Let us now return to the Coriscus Puzzle. In what
owo, I want to examine Aristotle's remarks in SE 179a
the passage which is most helpful to an under-
standing of his solution to paradoxes of accidence in
general, and the Coriscus Puzzle in particular.
The Coriscus Puz z le and the Principle of A
Earlier, I pointed out that in SE 179a26ff. Aristotle makes
it clear that he thinks that the Coriscus argument depends
on the fallacious principle of accidence. To appreciate
Aristotle's solution to the Coriscus Puzzle, then, we must,
among other things, try to establish precisely how that
principle might have been thought to generate that paradox.
The principle of accidence, it will be recalled,
says that whatever attributes belong to a given subject,
belong also to that subject's accidents and vice versa.
Buo what, in the Coriscus Puzzle, are we to count as at-
tributes, subject, and accident? There seems to be general
agreement that both 'You know' and 'You do not know' desig-
nate, on Aristotle's view, attributes, or "entities" which
may be said to "belong to" ( urrogp^acv)
,
certain other
things .
- Moreover, there is equally broad agreement that
1Among those who hold this—either explicitly or
Implicitly—are White, Peterson, Hamblin, and Poste.
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the subject must be Coriscus. What, then, is the accident
in question? It seems to me that we have little choice
but to say that it is whatever is designated by 'the one
approaching' ('to rrpoa^v ' ) . And, as puzzling as this
may seem, at least at first glance, it does open up a way
of showing how the principle of accidence-PA-mlght have
been thought to underlie the Coriscus Puzzle.
Consider the Coriscus argument again:
(1) You know Coriscus.
(2) You do not know the one approaching.
.
Coriscus is the one aporoaching.
You do not know Coriscus.
lou
^
now Coriscus and you do not know Coriscus.
..to; You know and you do not know the same thing.
The step of particular interest is from lines (2) and (3)
to (4). If we take line (3) to tell us that the one
approaching is an accident of Coriscus, then, since (2)
tells us that the one approaching has the attribute desig-
nated by ’You do not know’, PA allows us to infer (4)—
i.e. that Coriscus has the same attribute.
More, of course, needs to be said about some of
these suggestions. But, for the moment, let us assume
that this is, in fact, how Aristotle conceives of the role
of PA in the generation of the Coriscus Puzzle, and go on
to consider what he actually has to say about that prin-
ciple .
Aristotle ' s Rejection of the Principle of Accidence
.
At SE 179a26ff. Aristotle straightforwardly denies that
whatever attributes belong to an accident of a given sub-
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ject belong also to that subject:
^
l!
?
Ce ib is undetermined whether that which isid belongs to the
. subject whenever it belongs to
*e accident, and since in some cases it is thought
nop
and Said t0:> but in othe^s this is said to be "notnecessary, we ought, therefore, in all cases alikewhen a conclusion has been reached, say that it is'not necessary. y 1S
In support of this denial, Aristotle first pro-
duces several counter-examples. Although each of these is
simply identified by mention of a key phrase, it is clear
that Aristotle is referring us to well-known arguments that
he presumably thinks depend upon PA, yet which have true
premisses and a false conclusion. The Coriscus argument
is, of course, one of these.
All such arguments as those following commit the
fallacy of accidence. 'Do you know what I am about to
ask you?' * Do you know the one approaching
, or the
masked one?' ’Is the statue your work?’ or ’Is the dog
your father?’ ’Are the few, taken a few times, a few? ’2
The presentation of counter-examples to PA is, of
course, sufficient to demonstrate the falsity of that
principle. 3 But Aristotle is not content to leave the
matter there. He adds the following remarks:
It is clear in all these cases [i.e. in the counter-
^The emphasis is mine.
3Peter son, however, claims that the production of
these particular examples would not have convinced the
sophist of the falsity of his principle. (S. L. Peterson,
The Masker Paradox (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Prince-
ton, 1969), 117 ff.) Yet assuming that the sophist agrees
that his principle is the one that justifies these infer-
ences, it is not clear what more convincing counter-examples
could be produced, since, e.g., the Coriscus Puzzle, has
true premisses and a conclusion that is, in fact, self-
contradictory .
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examples just mentioned] that it is not necessary thattribute b
s
true of the accident anS ?he subjecf
without diff°
USht t
?
at t0 °nly those thinss Which areerence in substance and are one do all t-hpsame [attributes] belong. But with respect to the good
aboit ?fb
h
* S
a
rr\° b f-, the S° od and to be somethingu to be asked [about]; nor is it the same for theone approaching or the masked one to be, and forCoriscus to be. So that, as a result, it is not thecase that if I know Coriscus, but do not know the oneapproaching, that I know and do not know the samething . 4
These lines are of considerable interest; so let us examine
them more closely.
The first sentence simply reminds us that sophisms
such as the Coriscus Puzzle are clear cases in which we do
not want to allow that subject and accident have all their
attributes in common. But, in the next sentence, Aristotle
begins to give what I shall characterize as an "explanation"
of why subjects and accidents such as Coriscus and the one
„
^
It ^ should be observed that the phrase
TOC5 Ko<'Co<
-v rjv o<J CT(_°<y £v oucrtv . . .
translated here as ’to only those things which
difference in substance and are one’ —might be
alternatively, as ’to only those things which,
substance, are without difference and are one’
difference, of course, lies
v> oucr C o< v ’
in the fact that
( ’ in substance
’
)
p.ovo^ .
—which is
are without
translated
,
according to
The
whereas in the
is taken toformer, ’k«tcx ctj y ___
modify simply ’ o< qjo/oa (without difference), in the
latter it is taken to modify ’ cxS^acpopo^s xo<(.' £.v ’ (’with-
out
:c o<- 5difference and . . . one’).
As far as I have been able to determine, there is
no decisive consideration in favor of either reading.
Peterson has offered some reason for supposing that the
former is to be preferred ( The Masker Paradox pp. 131-135)
but the considerations she mentions are not entirely con-
vincing. Nevertheless, since—as far as my interpretation
is concerned—nothing of substance seems to turn on the
choice, I have elected to go along with Peterson's sug-
gestion.
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approaching should be
some of their attribut
The first line
statement
expected to differ with respect to
es . 5
of the explanation is the general
p
'
'
.
to
°J
lly those things which are without differ
UtlAUf.nTonT are °" e d0 ^e :aL
l -
As noted earlier, it seems plausible to rewrite this as
the conditional
(E1)
theF fan!
a
^.
their attributes in common,
diffelenr^ T ^mgs which are withoutl T r ce in suostance and are one.
Next
, Aristotle remarks on two of the counter-
examples that he has just mentioned. He says
But with respect to the good, it is not the same tobe .he good and to be something about to be asked-nor is it the same for the one approachLg (ofth4masked one) to be and for Coriscus to be
Each of these claims seems intended to be a denial of the
consequent of an instance of (El). That is, Aristotle’s
assertion of
(E2)' It is not the same to be the good and to be
something about to be asked
seems intended to be the denial of the consequent of
the good and what is about to be asked have
all their attributes in common, then the good
^My notion of "explanation" may appear to bear some
resemblance to Peterson's notion of "diagnosis." Howeverher suggestion that Aristotle, in the few lines in question,
is out to . diagnose "motives of error" attributes to Aris-
totle an interest in certain psychological matters that my
notion of "explanation" does not. (see The Masker Paradox,
pp. 106-131). —
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and what is about to be asked
without difference in substanc
are things which are
e and are one;
and his assertion.
(E2) '
'
Nor is it the same for the oneto be
.
. . and for Coriscus to
approaching
be.
seems intended to be the denial of the consequent of
(El) » T If the one approaching and Coriscus have alltheir attributes in common, then the oneapproaching and Coriscus are things wh?ch are
without difference in substance and are one.
If this last point is granted, then it should be
clear how Aristotle might be thought to be providing us with
an explanation of why subjects and accidents do not share
all their attributes. For, from (El)' and (E2)», we can
derive
(E3) The good and what is about to be asked do nothave all their attributes in common;
and from (El)" and (E2)" we can derive
(E3) The one approaching and Coriscus do not have all
their attributes in common.
In general, then, if asked why, from the fact that
a subject a has a certain attribute, F-ness, we cannot
infer that b--an accident of a—also has F-ness, Aristotle's
reply is simply this. The inference cannot be drawn be-
cause, if a and b had all their attributes in common, then
they would be without difference in substance and one; but
a and b are not without difference in substance and one.
It seems to me, then, that in his discussion of the
solution to paradoxes of accidence, Aristotle not only
identifies and rejects the principle of accidence, but he
87
also tries to explain why we should riot expect subjects
and their accidents to have all of their attributes
in common.
_
Yet this explanation, in turn, draws attention
to another important and interesting feature of Aristotle's
solution
.
The-No^lde.ntit y of Coriscus and The One Approaching
.
In the preceding paragraphs, I suggested that it seems
reasonable to assume that Aristotle takes
the being of a is not the same as the being of b
to be a way of denying
a and b are things which are without difference in
substance and are one.
This requires that we regard this last statement as im-
plying
the being of a is the same as the bding of b.
However, it seems equally reasonable to suppose that the
implication goes both ways. In that case, the two state-
ments in question can be treated as equivalent. Thus,
instead of saying
... to only those things which are without differ-
ence in substance and are one do all the same
[attributes] belong,
Aristotle might have put it this way:
. . . to only those things whose being (to )
is the same do all the same [attributes] belong.
That Aristotle would, in fact, have found the latter ac-
ceptable is confirmed by Physics 202bl il-l6:
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Y&f) T'cXuVot, rr4 v'Co< c T0T5
<5tX** ^ovov 0I5 To e?v<*<. Vo cxiro *
OTT COC^oO V
6
t-o
^5 o^UTo'C},
But what is the point of insisting that If a and b
share all their attributes, a and b must be not merely
one, but also "without difference in substance?" Does it
not follow from the fact that a and b are one, that a and
—
without difference in substance?
One might be inclined to answer this last question
affirmatively, provided that ’a and b are one ’ is taken to
mean f a and b are the same’. But, even allowing this,
Aristotle wants to answer "No." That is, Aristotle seems
to want to allow that some things are appropriately called
one," or "the same," even though they are different in
substance (outru) or being (to otv^c. ).
For example, he wants to say that the road from
Thebes to Athens is the same as the road from Athens to
Thebes, but the being (to ec.v'oce ) of the one is not the
same as the being of the other. 7 Furthermore, he thinks
that although the distance from A to B may be the same as
the distance from B to A, the being (to £cv<*0 of each is
o
not the same. And the process of Socrates’ teaching Plato
6"For it is not the case that all the same [attri-
butes] belong to things which are the same in any way
whatever, but only to those whose being is the same."
^ Physics 202bl3-l4.
^ Physics 202b20-22
.
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is held to be the same as the process of Plato's learning
from Socrates, but not "properly" <k U(0 ,'«5 ) the same-again,
because their ’’being” is not the sane. 9
Thus, on Aristotle's view, something, a, may be one
and the same as something, b, without being "properly” so.
But the view that things may be the "same,” but not
"properly” so, raises the possibility that 'same' may not
always be understood as * = •
. And this leads me to what
I take to be an interesting and significant feature of
Aristotle's solution to the Coriscus Puzzle.
I take it that Aristotle's point in insisting that
"to only those things which are without difference in snb-
itance do all the same attributes belong" is to warn
against the mistaken assumption that things which are one
and the same in any old way—even "improperly"—may have all
their attributes in common. Aristotle thinks the class of
indiscernibles is much narrower. Indiscernibles must also
be "without difference in substance." And it seems plausi-
ble to take this to mean that indiscernibles must be
Identical (where 'identical' is used in such a way that 'x
is identical to y' may be formalized as the well-defined
? x = y
' )
.
How, then, does this point bear on the Coriscus
Puzzle? When Aristotle tells us that the being of Coriscus
is not the same as the being of the one approaching, I take
9Physics 202b20-22
.
90
him to be denying that Coriscus and the one approaching
are identical. In other words, I think he would simply
deny the appropriateness of
Coriscus
- the one approaching
as a representation of
Coriscus is the one approaching.
Here my interpretation of Aristotle’s solution to
the Coriscus Puzzle diverges significantly from those of
White and Peterson. On each of the latter interpretations,
the assumption that Coriscus is identical with the one
approaching is left unquestioned. In fact, in each of
these cases, that assumption is crucial to the interpre-
tation. Both think that Aristotle is out to reject a
principle that licenses the inference from
^Km
c = m
to
~Kc
.
White takes the principle to be the indiscernibility of
identicals. He has Aristotle replacing that principle
with a "revised version" of the indiscernibility of
identicals. Peterson, on the other hand, thinks that the
principle being questioned is a substitution principle.
And she has Aristotle (like Carnap) putting a restriction
on that principle to cover cases involving opaque
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contexts. 10
In contrast to these suggestions, however, my own
view is that Aristotle's solution to the Coriscus Puzzle
involves two major steps. First, he attempts to clarify
the "logical form" of the premiss
( 3 ) Coriscus is the one approaching.
We should not be misled into thinking of (3) as
(3)
'
withou^°dif?°r
i3CUS
1
and the °ne ^^ching aret fe ence in substance and are one')
Rather, we should recognize that what (3) tells us is per-
haps more explicitly rendered by
( 3 )" The one approaching is an accident of Coriscus.
The next move, then, is to point out that, although
there is a valid principle that licenses the inference
from
a has the attribute F-ness
and
a = b
to
b_ has the attribute F-ness,
the principle required to licence the inference from
a has the attribute F-ness
and
10For a comparison of Peterson’s interpretation of
Aristotle's solution to the Coriscus Puzzle with Carnap’s
solution to "belief context paradoxes," see Peterson's
The Masker Paradox
. Section 21.
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to
b is an accident of a (or
-a is an accident of b
'
)
b has the attribute F-ness
—i.e. the principle of accidence— is plainly invalid.
Accidence and Samene ss
as "Accidentals
the_Same.’' The view that
Coriscus is the one approaching
should not be understood as
Coriscus = the one approaching
may seem to some to be rather implausible. But it seems to
me that this is Aristotle's position. So let me try to
develop it.
In Metaghyslcs V, 9, Aristotle says that 'tcxuToV
('same') is used in various ways. One such use—the
strictest"
— is the " <*o'c6
"
use. Another—and this is
the one that seems to me to be of particular interest here—
is the " Xc<xtx ko v " use.
At Metaphysics 10l8a5ff.
,
Aristotle links the notion
of -tdodv k*6>’*6c6 with that of "being one In substance."
Thus, it seems not unreasonable to suppose that he treats
a is the same in itself (kckQ 3 o(<jTo ) as b
as an alternative for
a and b are without difference in substance, and are
one
.
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But, since Aristotle clearly denies that Coriscus and the
one approaching are "without difference in substance, and
one," we must conclude that he would deny the truth of
Coriscus is the same in himself (-cai-cov i<«0> *6x6 )as the one approaching
Yet the possibility remains that Aristotle would allow
that Coriscus and the one approaching are nevertheless the
same accidentally (t^utov
. And, in fact,
there are at least two points that appear to support the
contention that this is_ what Aristotle would want to say.
First, at Metaphysics 1017bl7-l8, Aristotle allows
that the pale one (to ^jkov) is accidentally the same
as the musical one (to ^ouctckov), provided, presumably,
that the pale one is the musical one. Then, at Meta -
physics 1015bl7, he allows that Coriscus is accidentally
the same as the musical one (t~o j^o vcr
^
koJ)
,
again, assuming,
presumably, that Coriscus is the musical one. It seems to
me that if Aristotle thinks of the use of 'Wurov
o-u^jieprjKof' as appropriate in these cases--expecially the
latter— it is reasonable to suppose that he would allow
that
Coriscus is accidentally the same as the one
approaching
is also appropriate (given that Coriscus is the one
approaching)
.
Second, at Metaphysics 1017b30-l, we find the
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following claim:
*
r *
^
h
? musical one [is accidentally the sane aO
the other?
^ insofar as the one is an accident of
This suggests the principle
accident of/1 is true, then T* is acci-dentally the same as p1 is true.
Thus, one might reason, since 'the one approaching is an
accident of Coriscus', is true ’the one approaching is
accidentally the same as Coriscus’ is true too. 1 !
I shall assume, therefore, that although Aris-
totle would deny the truth of
Coriscus is the same in himself ( k«Q> ) as theone approaching.
i . e
. ,
Coriscus and the one approaching are without differ-
ence in substance, and are one,
i . e
. ,
Coriscus - the one approaching,
he would allow that
Coriscus is accidentally (xo<t.c< ssv] koj) the sam°
as the one approaching, 11
is true. But how are we to understand this distinction?
A First Approach to the Analysis of Accidental
oameness
. One approach to the analysis of expressions of
the form
a is accidentally the same as the P
11This, of course, requires the assumption that the
notion of ''accidence" in this passage of the Metaphysics
is the same as that found in De Sophisticis Elenchis .
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is outlined—however sketchily—in Nicholas P. White’s
"Aristotle on Sameness and Oneness,” and "Origins of
Aristotle's Essentialism. "12
Briefly, White suggests that, in his discussions
of accidental saneness and oneness, Aristotle treats
expressions such as ' tA and ’ To as
singular terms which designate entities distinct from
primary substances. That is, even if 'Coriscus is the
musical one' is true, 'Coriscus' and 'the musical one'
here designate different things. But, despite their
diversity, these two things are nevertheless "accident-
ally the same." Their accidental sameness consists in
their being, in some way
,
intimately related:
To say that "the man" and "the musical" are
. accidentally the same" seems to be to treat them asin some wav distinct things which are somehow linkedtogether. li
This suggestion, of course, needs to be filled out.
One wants to know something about the nature of entities
12White, "Aristotle on Sameness and Oneness,"
The Philosophical Review
,
LXXX, No. 2 (1971), esp. op.
lob-187
; "Origins of Aristotle's Essentialism," The^ Review
of Metaphysics
,
XXVI (September 1972), esp. pp. 7T-72 .
13White, "Origins of Aristotle's Essentialism."
p. 72, fn. 30. Incidentally, the fact that White claims
that, e.g. 'Coriscus' and 'the musical' designate distinct
entities, even if Coriscus is the musical (one), is diffi-
cult to reconcile with his view that the crucial inference
in the Coriscus Puzzle depends on the indiscernibility of
identicals. For., as indicated earlier, this latter point
requires that 'Coriscus is the (one) approaching' be under-
stood as 'Coriscus = the (one) approaching'.
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such as the musical one, the pale one, etc. One wants
also to know more about the relation of "being somehow
linked together." Unfortunately, however, White-at least
in the papers just mentioned-says little about either of
these matters. Yet he does try to offer some support for
the claim that Aristotle did in fact think that expressions
such as 'To |ioocru<ov 1 ('the musical one'), < T± AtUKoV
('the pale one'), etc., do designate entities which are
neither primary substances nor members of any category
other than substance.
For instance, in "Origins of Aristotle's Essential-
ism," White says
It has been suggested thus far that it is onlv sub-stance at tributes whose loss, so to speak, entails the
°i
the sensible Particular which had them.Ther. are, however, a number of passages which seem toindicate that according to Aristotle, even the loss ofa non-substance attribute takes something out of exis-
example
,
if Socrates ceases to be musical,
xS sometimes willing to say that something
called ’the musical (thing)” ( rd uoocn,<^) perishes
or ceases to exist. Similarly too, he sometimes talks
i,s,™hen Soc ^ates comes to be musical, we can saythat the musical' comes into existence ( vCvvzx ,*</).Examples of this way of talking can be found, e.g., at
Phys. l88b4-8
,
190al-3, 16-21. He also sometimes allows
such talk in connection with an expression like "the
musical man”: the perishing of the musical man takes
place when the man ceases to be musical (An. Pr. 47b33-
12-20
hy
63-65)
b^'190a13 ’ 20 ' 21 ’ 195b18 -21
’
22 5a3-5,
^ White
,
"Origins of Aristotle's Essentialism,
"
p. 7 -l. For White's claim that expressions such as '
-co
^ouo-cxov' (at least in the contexts under consideration)
do not designate attributes, see p. 72.
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But one might be inclined to object that White has
been too hasty here. Plainly there are passages in which
Aristotle "talks as if" there are things such as the musical
one, the pale one, etc. Yet should we conclude from this
that Aristotle would allow that, in fact, expressions such
as ' the musical one*, ’the pale one*, etc., designate non-
substantial entities of some sort?
Surely one may "talk as if" there are such things
as the musical one, the pale one, and (to choose a recent
example that should help to make the point) the present
King of France, while holding that expressions such as
the musical one’, 'the pale one' and 'the present King of
France', fail to designate (or denote) any individual at
all. Such, of course, was Russell's position. And the
point is simply that
,
while acknowledging that certain
expressions may appear to be singular terms, they are in
fact not, since they can be paraphrased away. ^-5
Interestingly enough, White entertains the possi-
bility that Aristotle might have regarded expressions of
the form 'the F' as eliminable by paraphrase. Yet his con-
clusion is that, although this possibility may be some-
what "inviting," it is not supported by the evidence.
Aristotle's way of treating an expression such as 'the
1 5see, for example, Bertrand Russell's "On
Denoting," Mind, Hi, (1905).
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musical one- is "not to paraphrase It away, and he nowhere
makes an aoross-the board attempt to do so. "16
X f^nd this last point persuasive. Furthermore,
I think that especially with the paraphrase possibility
ruled out—passages such as those that White refers to
(In the above quotation) do present a fairly strong case
in favor of the view that Aristotle takes expressions
such as ’-ci ftou o-twiv' etc. (in the contexts under con-
sideration) to designate entities other than substances.
Other passages, too, might be taken to support the view
For instance, in his commentary on Metaphysics 1015b23,
Christopher Kirwan states that
are nniT"^ ^ artlstlc l>° and Coriscus
^
CaUSe °ne coincides in the other"; theseitems, then, are regarded by Aristotle as different
then
S
iAto
h
r^
r
H
la
r
l0n
-
hip
i 7
f coincidiag combinesn m n a kind of unity. 17
But, supposing now that such a view is, in fact, Aris-
totle’s, how does this help in the project at hand—i.e.
understanding the distinction between
Coriscus - the one approaching
and
ing?
SCUS iS accidentally the same as the one approach-
1 White, "Origins of Aristotle’s Essentialism,"
, ,
^Aristotle’s Metaphysics
, translated with notesby Christopher Kirwan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971),
P. 134.
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is clear that, if Aristotle holds that 'Coriscus'
and
' the one approaching' designate different entities,
then he cannot (consistently) hold that
Coriscus = the one approaching
But if the one approaching’ does not designate
Coriscus (even if Coriscus is the one approaching), then
what does it designate? And why should Aristotle think
that whatever it designates is, nevertheless,
"accidentally
the same as" Coriscus?
In a Provocative footnote to "Origins of Aris-
totle’s Essentialism,
" White remarks that "It begins to
look a little as if the objects which Aristotle has in mind
[i.e. the designata of ^ KoV, etc.] are like what
Carnap called ’individual concepts'
. .
."18 White, how-
ever does not pursue this. Yet, since I too find this sug-
gestion tempting, let me try to push It a little further.
To understand Carnap's notion of an "individual
concept" we must have recourse to his distinction between
"extensions" and "intensions" of individual expressions.
Carnap states that distinction as follows:
The extension of an individual expression is the indi-vidual to which it refers.
The Intension of an individual expression is the indi-
vidual concept expressed by it. 19
1
8
Nicholas P. White, "Origins of Aristotle's
Essentialism," p. 7 6, fn. 40.
^Rudolph Carnap, Meaning and Necessity (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 40-41.
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illustrate (by way of Carnap's own example), each of
the individual expressions, 'Walter Scott' and 'the author
of Waverley', has both an extension and an intension. The
—
-
6nSl0n
-
of each is " the individual to which it refers"--
i.e. Walter Scott, i.e. the author of Waverley. But the
Intension of 'Walter Scott' is the individual concept
Walter Scott, (and not the individual concept The Author of
Waverley); and the intens ion of 'the author of Waverley' Is
the individual concept The Author of Waverley (and not the
individual concept Walter Scott). Thus, according to
^arnap, although the individual expressions 'Walter Scott'
and 'the author of Waverley' have the same extension
,
their intensions are different.
Of course, I do not wish to claim that Aristotle
anticipated something like Carnap's distinction between
extension and intension. All that is being suggested is
that Aristotle seems to treat individual expressions as
if they designate, even in "transparent” contexts, entities
like Carnap's individual concepts. And, clearly, one
advantage of such a view is that we do, in that case, have
a way of understanding why Aristotle might have taken
Coriscus = the one approaching
to be false. For this sentence would express something
20For a discussion of the notion of referential
"transparency," see W. V. 0. Quine, Word and Object
(.Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, i 960). Section 30 (esp. p. 144).
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like the proposition that the individual concept Coriscus
is identical with the individual concept The One
Approaching, which is simply not true. 21
But if Aristotle's view about the designata of
individual expressions is as suggested, then what would
have to be the case in order for a sentence
r
tx
~ fS
n
to be true? In other words, what should we expect the
identity conditions for these "individual-concept-like"
entities to be? Clearly it is not sufficient to require
simply that
is y3">
y, .
2 course, although I have expressed symDathy forWhite s suggestion about Aristotle's view of the designata
exP r
J
ssions
> 1 am not unaware of the fact thatthat suggestion raises a number of serious difficulties.
For example, if it is allowred that in any context,
an expression such as 'the one approaching* designates an
GOncePtj how are We to understand sentences such
as The^ one approaching is taller than Socrates’ or 'Xan-
thippe kissed^ the one approaching*. Surely no one can kissthe individual concept The One Approaching; nor is it possi-ble for that concept (or, for that matter, any concept) tobe taller than something else. Yet don't the sentencesjust mentioned, where 'the one approaching' is taken todesignate an individual concept, in fact imply such
absurdities?
Then there is the question of the identity
tions of these Aristotelian entities. Carnap tells
the identity or non-identity of individual concepts
determined on the basis of . . . semantical rules . . .
(Meaning and Necessity
, p. 4l). But it is not clear just
how Aristotle proposes to deal with this issue. He seems
to want to deny that Coriscus is identical with the one
approaching. But would he allow that there are any true
identity statements of the form
condi-
us that
"can be
It
= pP
where c< ^ p ? If so, which are they? And why those but not
Coriscus = the one approaching?
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be true. For, after all, although Aristotle does—on my
view, at least
—want to deny that
Coriscus = the one approaching
Is true, he Just as clearly does not want to deny the
truth of
Coriscus is the one approaching,
should, then, if Aristotle's view is as suggested,
expect to find him laying down a stricter condition. But
Isn't that exactly what he does?
It will be recalled that Aristotle's reason for
denying that Coriscus and the one approaching have all their
attributes in common is that "[it is not] the same for the
one approaching to be ...
,
and for Coriscus to be."
>SE 179b 3— 4 ) This suggests that a necessary condition for
the truth of
r
o< and y3 are indiscernible -1
is that
rto be o< is the same as to be js,n
be true. It is not enough that simply
r
<* is jQ
n
be true. But, if
** and j3 are indiscernible
-1
is true if and only if
r
o<
=
/P
is true (and I assume that Aristotle does hold this), then
the truth of
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rto be o< is the same as to be
must be a necessary condition for the truth of
r o< =
It seems to me, then, that even Aristotle's re-
marks on the fallacy of accidence itself—specifically
,
SE 179a38ff.—can be thought of as lending further support
to the view that Aristotle regards the designata of indi-
vidual expressions as being something like Carnap's indi-
vidual concepts. And since, on this view, it is clear why
Aristotle would not want to allow that
Coriscus = the one approaching
Is true, let us turn now to the question of why he might,
nevertheless, have wanted to say that
Coriscus is accidentally the same as the one ap-proaching ^
is true.
The answer to this last question is, I suspect,
simply this. Coriscus may be correctly said to be "acci-
dentally the same as" the one approaching in virtue of the
fact thao, although to be Coriscus is not the same as to be
the one approaching, Coriscus, nevertheless, is_ the one
approaching. And in general, a sentence
r
c< is accidentally the same as j3
~^
is true just in case
(i) r©< is /3n Is true, but
(ii) rto be
10-4
04 iS the same as to be jP is not true .2 2
Of course, I have not tried to say what might be
meant by statements of the form
To be o< is the same as to be a 1
Does Aristotle mean something like
^The essence of * is the same as the essence of
But what does this mean? Or perhaps what is intended is
something like
Necessarily, o< is
/
Yet, again, what sort of "necessity" is this—logical
,
physical, or something else? Might Hintikka’s suggestion
about a connection between "time and necessity" in Aris-
totle’s thinking be helpful here? 2 3
These seem to me to be interesting and important
questions. But they go far beyond the limited goal that I
22lV S W°rth notinS th*t this statement of the
tence^of the conditions for the truth of sen-ces o form rc* is accidentally the same as bears
TTTWr resemblance to my earlier statement (in Chapter
; Zu V he neces sary and sufficient conditions for the
sentences of the form ^ is an accident of c* -1
.In fact, given that c* is the same as j3
n is equivalent toto be * is the same as to be /P
,
the truth-conditions
mK
r
4-
Sf^ en ? eS ° f b0th of the above forms will be the same.is appropriate is perhaps confirmed to some ex-tent by Aristotle’s remark at Metaphysics 1017b26ff. that
. . . man and musical are [accidentally] the same because
one is an accident of the other; and the musical one [is
accidentaily the same as] (a) man because it is an accident
oi the man .
"
2 3Recall my Chapter III, fn. 19.
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have set—viz. that of establishing some plausibility for
the claim that although Aristotle would allow that Coriscus
may be the one approaching, and may even be said to be
accidentally the same as" the one approaching, it is false
that Coriscus is identical with the one approaching.
Some Advant ages of the Present Interpretation
.
Finally, let me draw attention to several additional points
In support of the view that I have been defending.
First, if it is correct that Aristotle denies that
Coriscus and the one approaching are identical, then, on
his view, the principle required to license the inference
from, e.g..
You do not know the one approaching
and
Coriscus is the one approaching
to
You do not know Coriscus,
would be logically independent of the principle of the
indiscernibility of Identicals. Consequently
,
Aristotle’s
rejection of the former would not require his rejection of
the latter . Thus, there is no reason to suppose—as some
(e.g. White and Peterson) have argued—that in solving the
paradoxes of accidence, Aristotle is forced to deny the
indiscernibility of identicals—a principle which, earlier,
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at Topics 152b25-29, he clearly affirms. 2 *1
Second, given that Aristotle takes the designate
of the individual expressions,
'Coriscus' and 'the one
approaching', to be distinct
"individual-concept-like"
entities, there is no need to try to develop more compli-
cated reconstructions of the Coriscus Puzzle such as that
proposed by Peterson.
Peterson formulates Aristotle’s argument in such
a way as oo suggest that the difficulty inherent in it
turns on the logical peculiarities of opaque propositional
knowledge contexts. Of course, as pointed out earlier,
such a formulation strays from literal representation of
the Greek. But Peterson feels compelled to make this move
because on the literal representation, we should have to
allow that both
You know Coriscus (i.e. Coriscus has the attribute
of being known by you)
and
You do not know the one approaching (i.e. the one
approaching has the attribute of being not known by
you)
are true; and yet, in her opinion, since Coriscus is
identical with the one approaching, this cannot be the
case
.
Yet, if—as I have recommended—we simply give up
P llmThis point has already been touched upon in
Chapter III.
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the assumption that 'Coriscus’ and ’the one approaching’
designate the same entity, then there is no need to
abandon the literal version of the argument. Of two
distinct entities, it is possible that one should have the
attribute of being known by you while the other has the
attribute of being not known by you.
Third--and last— it will be recalled that one of
the criticisms levelled against Peterson's substitut ivity
interpretation was that it leaves Aristotle with a plainly
implausible view. That view is that
. . . expressions substitutable in knowledge contexts
must also be substitutable in ’ is not different in
respect of substance from * and 'to be is to be ’
And 'knowledge contexts', here, includes contexts such as
You do not know that ... is the darkest one in the
market-place
But, as pointed out earlier, we can validly infer
You do not know that the one approaching is the darkest
one in the market-place
from
You do not know that Coriscus is the darkest one in
the market place
given simply
You know that Coriscus is the one approaching
.
It is by no means necessary that Coriscus be "not different
in respect of substance from the one approaching." Now,
25see Chapter I.
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however, it seems only fair to consider whether
comes out any better, with respect to this issue
interpretation.
Aristotl
j on my
e
On the account that I have offered, Aristotle re
Jects the assumption that
Cor_Lscus is the one approaching
means the same as
Coriscus = the one approaching
He then argues that, in that case, there
accept the inference.
is no necessity to
You do not know the one approaching
Coriscus is the one approaching
.'.You do not know Coriscus.
And all that is claimed here, is that from the information
that the one approaching has the attribute of being not
known by you, and that Coriscus is the one approaching, it
does not follow that Coriscus has the attribute of being
not known by you—the reason being that although Coriscus
is the one approaching, it is not the case that Coriscus
and the one approaching are "without difference in sub-
stance." In other words, it is not the case that
’Coriscus = the one approaching’ is true. And hence it is
not the case that whatever "belongs to" Coriscus "belongs
to" the one approaching. But this implies nothing about
conditions under which co-designative expressions are
intersubst itutable in propositional knowledge contexts. So
my interpretation does not seem to have the unfortunate
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consequence that Peterson’s does.
It may, however, be objected that, in any case, on
my interpretation, Aristotle requires that a necessary
condition for (validly) inferring
rYou know ^
from
rYou know oT
is that
rto be o< is the s*me as to be p*
be true. And this is false, since surely the inference
(1) You know Coriscus
(2) You know tha.t Coriscus is the one approaching
.*.(3) You know the one approaching
should count as valid, in which case, since (2) presumably
does not imply
to be Coriscus is to be the one approaching,
the truth of this last sentence is apparently not a neces-
sary condition for the validity of the argument. Hence,
the objector might conclude, my interpretation suffers from
a defect at least similar to Peterson's.
Yet there is, I think, an easy response to this.
The point is simply that it is false that, on my inter-
pretation, Aristotle is committed to the view just stated.
It is true that my account has it that Aristotle is_
committed to the claim that, e.g., the truth of ’to be
Coriscus is the same as to be the one approaching' is a
necessary condition for validly inferring that, for any
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attribute, P-ness, if Coriscus has F-ness then the one
approaching has P-ness. But this last claim does not imply
that the truth of 'to be Coriscus is the same as to be the
one approaching' is a necessary condition for validly in-
ferring that if Coriscus has the attribute of being
known by you then the one approaching has the attribute of
being known by you. Of course, the latter does follow
from
For any attribute, F-ness, the truth of 'to be
Coriscus is the same as to be the one approaching'
is a necessary condition for validly inferring that
if Coriscus has F-ness, then the one approaching has
F-ness
.
However, there is nothing in my interpretation to suggest
that Aristotle held this.^ 0
£ * £
This, then, concludes the presentation and defence
of my interpretation of the Coriscus Puzzle. However, we
have not yet exhausted Aristotle's remarks on the paradox.
So let us return, briefly, to De Sophistlcis Elenchis XXIV
to examine an attempt by Aristotle to discredit a solution
that was apparently in competition with his own.
26<rhe important difference between the two claims
distinguished in this paragraph is, of course, the differ-
ence between the scopes of the two occurrences of the
quantifier 'for any attribute, F-ness'.
Ill
Aristotle’s Rejection
—
the QuaHflcation Solution
Immediately after he presents his own solution to
the Coriscus Puzzle, Aristotle undertakes to show that a
certain alternative solution is inadequate. Prom
Aristotle's opening sentence, it is clear that at least
someone known to him embraced this view. In fact, the
fact that Aristotle deals with it at length might indicate
that it was a popular line to take against the sophists.
I shall call this alternative solution "the qualification
solution.
"
Th_e Qualification Solution as a Response to the
Coriscus Fuzzle Aristotle begins his discussion of the
qualification solution this way:
tion
SOm
?o?°thev
t
^
Se
-,?
a
-
adOXeS by confuting the ques-. F r * say it is possible to know and not to
,J?
0W sai
]!
e not in the same respect.Wien, therefore, they do not know the one approaching,
do k?ow Coriscus, they say that they know and
6 Same thing
> but not in the same respect.
V.oL 179D/-11)
The question" referred to here is presumably ’Do
you know the one approaching?’ When the sophist puts this
question, it is expected that the respondent will reply,
"No." Then the sophist goes on to argue that, since the
respondent does know Coriscus, and Coriscus is the one
approaching, he the respondent
—
does know the one approach-
ing. The proponent of the qualification solution, however,
anticipates the sophist's move, and grants at the outset
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that he both does and does not know the one approaching.
That is, to the question 'Do you know the one approach-
ing?' he responds, "Yes and no." This, then, has the
effect of confuting the sophist's question. The pro-
ponent of the qualification solution-let us call him
"the qualifier" for short—has disarmed the sophist by em-
bracing his paradoxical thesis (that he—the qualifier—
both knows and does not know the same thing).
But, of course, the qualifier cannot leave it at
that. /Jhao he must do is to show how he can maintain that
he both knows and does not know the same thing, without
contradicting himself. His way of doing this is to claim
that f I both know and do not know the same thing’, is el-
liptical for 'I both know and do not know the same thing,
but in different respects ’
.
But what does it mean to say that one both knows
and does not know the same thing, but in different re-
spects? First, let us consider what it might be to
know a given thing in a certain respect. From what Aris-
totle says at SE 179b27ff., it seems that one who knows
"Coriscus, that he is Coriscus" ( rov Kop(o-Kou ore
KoptorKo^), knows Coriscus in a certain respect—the respect
being what is expressed by ’ ore Ko0 (0^ 05 * . On the other
hand, for one who does not know "the one approaching, that
he is approaching" (ro Trpoo-cov ore Tijooo'kov ) , there is a
respect in which he does not know the one approaching—the
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respect being expressed by 'o'u irpocr
»
.
27
On the basis of this, it seems that what the
qualifier wants to suggest is that, although one cannot
both know (simpliciter ) and not know (simpliciter ) a
given individual, x, and although one cannot both know and
and not know x in the same respect—e.g. that he is F, one
can both know and not know x in different respects—e.g.
know x, that he is F, and not know x, that he is G.
The application of this point to the Corlscus
Puzzle is presumably thought to go like this. We can go
along with the argument that the sophist has presented—
i
. e
.
(1) You know Corlscus.
(2) You do not know the one approaching.
Corlscus is the one approaching.
.*.(4) You know and do not know the same thing.
But then, when the sophist alleges that he has led us into
a contradiction, we simply deny it. Line (4), we say, is
elliptical for
(4) T You know someone, that he is Corlscus; and you do
not know that same one, that he is (the one)
approaching.
And (4)' is not a contradiction.
Aristotle ' s First Criticism
. Aristotle offers two
^ 70f course, expressions such as 'you know Corlscus,
that he is Corlscus' are not ordinary English. But they
are literal translations of the Greek; and I have chosen to
retain such literalness here, rather than to offer a more
"natural" reading, for reasons that will become evident in
the next section.
im
criticisms of the qualification solution. The first is
this
:
• . . as ive have said already, it is necessary for
refted^n the^
tUrn °n]
p
he Same [point] to be cor-cted i e same way. But this will not be the caseif one should adopt the same principle in regard not
’
to knowing but tb being, or to being in a cfr?ain
11 what
,J;S before one is a father, and it isy urs - or even n it is sometimes true that it is
Snfnr 6 , 1 ? i??0W ^nd not t0 know the same thing, thatkina of solution does not apply here. (SE 179bll-17)
It should be recalled that Aristotle thinks that the
various paradoxes mentioned earlier all turn on the fal-
lacious principle of accidence. 28 The criticism offered
here is simply that, although the qualifier's point may be
applicable in certain cases, there are some paradoxes of
accidence to which that point is obviously inapplicable
—
for example, Aristotle suggests, the "Is the dog your
father?" paradox.
\
Such a criticism is reminiscent of an objection I
brought against both the indiscernibility interpretation
and the substitutivity interpretation. In Chapter I, I
argued that although these Interpretations might have some
plausibility in the context of the Coriscus Puzzle, it is
not at all clear how they might be thought to work in the
case of other paradoxes of accidence. And, since Aris-
totle's solution to the Coriscus Puzzle is held by him to
be applicable to all paradoxes of accidence, suspicion is
28 SE 179a26-27.
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thus cast on these interpretations of that solution.
Aristotle, however, anticipates a response to this
first criticism. The qualifier, he seems to think, may
argue that although he (the qualifier) has not presented
the solution to the Coriscus Puzzle that Aristotle thinks
appropriate, he has, nevertheless, provided a solution to
the paradox.
In reply to this, Aristotle allows that a sophism
may contain more than one defect:
• . . there is nothing to hinder the same argumentfrom having more than one flaw; (SE 179bl7-l8)
but he goes on to maintain that "it is not the exposure of
every fault that constitutes a solution." Specifically,
the sort of thing that Aristotle has in mind is this:
. . .it is possible to show that something false hasbeen derived, without showing what [the derivation]
turns on, e.g. Zeno’s argument that there is no motion.
So that, even if one undertakes to prove that this is
impossible, he is mistaken, even if he has demonstrated
it ten thousand times. For this is not a solution.
For it was held that the solution is the exhibition of
fallacious demonstration, from which that which is
false [is derived]. If, therefore, one has not demon-
strated his case, or is attempting to prove something
true or false in a fallacious manner, the pointing out
of that is a solution, (179bl8-26)
In other words, if, when presented with a sophism, one
simply tries to show that the conclusion of that sophism is
false by producing counter-arguments, one is not thereby
providing a solution to the sophism. A solution must make
clear precisely what has gone wrong in the sophist's
argument
.
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Thus, even If the qualifier's point with respect
to the Corisous Puzzle— l.e. that the sophist Is entitled
to conclude not
You know (simpliciter ) and do not know (simpliciter)the same thing,
but only
You know someone, that he is Coriscus and you do notknow the same one, that he is (the one) approaching
—
were a good one, he would still not have provided a solution
to that paradox. To do this, he must explain why the for-
mer does not follow— i.e. he must expose the fallacious
principle upon which the relevant inference depends.
Aristotle's Second Criticism . In his first criti-
cism of the qualification solution, Aristotle leaves open
the question of whether the qualifier's point, despite the
fact that it does not count as a solution to the Coriscus
Puzzle, is a good one. In his second criticism, he argues
that it is not.
Aristotle acknowledges that there are cases in
which it is generally held to be possible to know and not
to know the same thing in different respects. In fact, at
179b30-31, he gives an example:
. . . it is held to be possible to know and not to
know the same thing; e.g., on the one hand, to know
that it is pale, but, on the other hand, not to know
that it is musical. For in this way one knows and does
not know the same thing, but not in the same respect.
Yet Aristotle thinks that the qualifier's move with respect
to the Coriscus Puzzle simply will not work. The qualifier
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is, according to Aristotle, wrong in suggesting that
although
You
the
know
same
(simpliciter ) and do not know (simoliciter
)
thing '
does not follow from the relevant premisses.
You know someone,
know that same one
that he is Coriscus, and do not
,
that he is (the one) approaching
does
.
Aristotle's argument is contained in the following
lines
:
Perhaps there is nothing to prevent this [present
Itfnc^
10nyJr?m ^Pp6ning [t0 be true] ^ some in-ances. let in these cases this would not be thought
inn
S
1
° ]
'
i
Cr
w
he knows Coriscus, that he is Coriscus,a d L he knows] the one approaching that he is (the one)
approaching.
. .
. [hence] with respect to the one
approaching i.e. Coriscus—
-one knows both that he is
approaching and that he is Coriscus. (SE 179b26-33)
From the first line I gather that Aristotle thinks
that, although
(i) You know Coriscus
and
(ii) You do not know the one approaching
are assumed to be true, in the context of the Coriscus
Puzzle the following statements are also true:
(iii) You know Coriscus, that he is Coriscus
and
(iv) You know the one approaching, that he is
approaching.
And the quotation goes on to suggest that, from (iii) and
(iv), Aristotle thinks we can infer
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(v) You know the one
that he is (the
Coriscus
.
approaching
—i.e. Coriscus--
one) approaching, and that he is
The point of (v) seems to be to suggest that,
contrary to the qualifier's supposition that the individual
concerned knows someone (i.e. the one approaching, i.e.
Coriscus), that he is Coriscus, but not that he is (the one)
approaching, what he in fact knows is the one approaching-
i.e. Coriscus that he is Coriscus, and that he is
approaching
.
But we should note that (v) does not follow from
(iii) and (iv) by themselves. For one thing, these
premisses contain no information about the relation between
Coriscus and the one approaching. It seems that at least a
necessary condition for inferring (v) from (iii) and (iv)
is that we assume, in addition to these premisses,
Coriscus is identical with the one approaching.
Of course, I have argued that Aristotle denies the truth of
this last statement. But what we must assume is, I think,
that Aristotle is allowing, for the purposes of this cri-
ticism, that the qualifier leaves unquestioned the sophist's
assumption that it is true.
In other words, Aristotle's second criticism, put
concisely, is this. The qualifier says that all we need do
to resolve the Coriscus Puzzle is to show that the conclu-
sion is elliptical (in the way specified). Aristotle's
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response to this is that if we so allow the sophist the
mistaken assumption,
Coriscus is identical with the
then, since
You know Coriscus, that he is Coriscus
one approaching,
and
You know the one approaching, that he is approaching
are true, it follows that
You know Coriscus i.e. the one approaching
—that heis (the one) approaching, and that he is Coriscus
is also true. But if this last statement is true, then the
qualifier’s expanded conclusion must be false.
A._C°mment on Aristotle's Second Criticism
. But
perhaps we should examine more carefully whether Aristotle
has, in fact, shown that the qualifier is not entitled to
his expanded conclusion.
I have represented the qualifier's expanded con-
clusion as
(a) You know someone, that he is Coriscus and you do
not know that same one, that he is (the one)
approaching.
And Aristotle's alleged counter-claim has been expressed as
(b) You know the one approaching— i.e. Coriscus—that
he is (the one) approaching, and that he is
Coriscus
.
But what might have led the qualifier to assert (a)?
Let us suppose that the qualifier assumed that the
individual referred to by 'You' in the Coriscus argument
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knew the following proposition to be true—
Coriscu s is Coriscus
but he assumed that the same individual did not know that
Coriscus is (the one) approaching
is true. Then the qualifier would be entitled to affirm
the truth of
(c) You know that Coriscus is Coriscus and vonnot know that Coriscus is (the'nej approaching.
And from this statement, it might have seemed quite natural
to move to
(a) You know someone,
not know that same
approaching. 29
that he is Coriscus, and you do
one, that he is (the one)
raf „M i.
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However, an interesting quirk develops here. For Hintikkatakes the ordinary language version of (i) to be
(ii) You know who Coriscus is.
And the qualifier might argue that this
— (ii)— is, in any
case, a datum of the Coriscus Puzzle; hence, although (a)’does not follow from (c)’ alone, it is, nevertheless, true,
since (c)' and (ii) (i.e. (i)) are both true, and (a) 1 doesiollow (at least in Hintikka's system) from the conjunction
of these latter two statements. The proof is this:
(1) ^Xy(c = c) . ~Ky(c = a)1 <l u. Premiss
(2) r(3x)Ky(x = c) 1 <= r Premiss
(3) r^(3x)[Ky(x = c) . ~Ky(x = a)]"1 e jx. Counter-
(x)~[Ky(x = c) . ~Ky(x = a)] 1 e
^ (
3 ) (C . ~E)( 4 )
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It does seem reasonable to suppose that the Indi-
vidual referred to by
-You' In the Coriscus argument would
know that Coriscus Is Coriscus; and, of course, he Is
ignorant of the fact that Coriscus is (the one) approaching.
So the qualifier does seem to be justified in asserting
(o). But does it follow, then, that Aristotle's (b) must
be false?
Certainly, Aristotle's statement.
You know the one approaching
—i.e. Coriscus- t-hat-is (the one) approaching, and that he is Coriscus.
h
is false if construed as
(d) You know that the proposition the one approaching—
• ?——
?
r
-J-° g us
-is (the one ) approaching is trimand you know that the proposition the one
approaching—i.e. . Coriscus— is Coriscus is true.
For one who knows the proposition
IM^^proaching-.i.e. ,-^o_r.l 3cus-ls (th^ne)
to be true, presmuably knows also that
Coriscus is (the one) approaching
is true. And this would contradict a basic assumption of
the Coriscus Puzzle i.e., that the one designated by 'You'
does not know
Coriscus is (the one) approaching
to be true. But there seems to be at least one other way
to understand Aristotle’s assertion, (b).
( 5 )
.( 6 )
,( 7 )
r(3x)(x = c)1 e p.
r
~[Ky(c = c). ~Ky(c = a)] -1 € u
r(3x ) [Ky (x = c). ~Ky(x = a)]*1 £
(2)
(C.EK=)
(*0,(5)(C.Uo)
( 3 ) - ( 6 )
R . A . A .
122
Perhaps what Aristotle has in mind is simply
(e) You know of the one approaching (i.e., Coriscus)—however he may be designated
— that he is fthe nn»\approaching, and that he is Coriscus? °
The difference between (d) and (e) is—to use Quine’s
terminology that whereas (d) is an "opaque” interpretation
of <b), (e) is a "transparent" reading. 30 Consequently,
whereas (d) implies that there is a certain proposition
Oh^agproarh^g—j^^^^Coriscus
—is (the one) approach.
lng that the individual in question knows to be true, (e)
does not imply this. And thus (e), unlike (d), does not
yield the undesirable result that
Coriscus is the one approaching
is known (by you) to be true. In fact, (e) seems to be
quite consistent with the facts of the Coriscus Puzzle.
ut seems to me, then, that there is a way of
understanding how both Aristotle and the qualifier might
have come to think that their respective claims
—
(b) and
(a)—were true. And, in view of the prima facie plausi-
bility of each's case, it appears doubtful that Aristotle’s
30See Quine's "Quantification and Prooositional
Attitudes," The Journal of Philosophy. LIII (1956), pp.
177-187; Word and Object (New York, I960)., l^lff.
According to Quine, a sentence
r
c* knows that p is y^
admits of the "transparent" interpretation provided that it
is implied by any sentence
r
o< knows that S is y"1
where
n
/3 Is S'*
is also true.
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mere assertion of (b) would be sufficient to convince the
qualifier that his claim— (a)—is false. For Aristotle,
in fact, has not really shown it to be false. He has
presented an argument for what he takes to be a counter-
claim. But he has nor established that it is, in fact, a
counter-claim. Nor has he made clear just what assumptions
his own argument rests upon, and why they are preferable to
those adopted by the qualifier. To use Aristotle’s own
terminology, if there is a problem with the qualifier's
inference from the premisses of the Coriscus Puzzle to (a),
Aristotle has not provided the "solution" ( Aocrt.5 ).31
* * *
This brings me to the end of my remarks on Aris-
totle’s treatment of the Coriscus Puzzle. In the next
chapter I shall try to show how Aristotle might have come
to think of the solution to that paradox as applicable to
the other examples that he mentions. Specifically, this will
involve showing how the principle of accidence might have
been thought to generate those paradoxes. As we shall see,
this is not very clear in some cases. Yet, at the same time,
the likelihood of being able to make a case for the
principle of accidence being involved in each of these
examples seems to me to be greater than the likelihood of
3lRecall Aristotle’s remarks on ' Aocrij '
179b23-24.
at SE
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being able to make a similar case for either White’s
principle of the indiscernibility of identicals or Peter-
son’s principle of substitution.
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CHAPTER V
EXTENSION OP THE INTERPRETATION TO THE REMAINING PARADOXES
—
—
—
-
You Know that which I am going to Ask You about?"
The "Do you know that which I am going to ask you
about? bears, I have assumed, a close resemblance to the
Coriscus Puzzle. As a result, it is the easiest of the
remaining paradoxes to deal with. That is, we can show
how it might have been thought to qualify as a paradox of
accidence simply by observing and developing the rather
obvious parallels between it and the Coriscus Puzzle.
The reconstruction of the "Do you know what I am
going to ask you about?" that I have proposed is this:
(1) You know the good.
(2) You do not know that which I am going to ask you
about
.
(3) The good is that which I am going to ask you about.
(4; You know and you do not know the same thing.
I assume that, as in the Coriscus Puzzle, ’You know' and
You do not know* may be taken to designate attributes.
Furthermore to continue the parallel—— it seems reasonable
to suppose that ’the good’ designates the subject, and that
'that which I am going to ask you about' designates the
accident. For then the argument can be regarded as being
of precisely the same form as the Coriscus Puzzle; i.e.
when the implicit steps are filled in, we have the following
(1) You know the good.
(2) You do not know that which I am going to ask you
about
.
(3) The good is that which I am going to ask you about.
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You do not know the good
*
; /^
You know the g°od and you do not know the Food
- (6) You know and do not know the same thing?
The fallacious inference, in that case, would lie-
according to Aristotle
—in the move from (2) and (3) to
(4). For that inference goes from the information that
that which I am going to ask you about has the attribute,
(being) not know by you (line (2)), together with the in-
formation that that which I am going to ask you about is
an accident of the good (line (3)), to the conclusion that
ohe good has the attribute, (being) not known by you
(line (4)). And this move, Aristotle would presumably
point out, depends upon the fallacious principle of acci-
dence.
Of course, one may feel a bit uneasy about the sug
gestion that that which I am going to ask you about "is an
accident of" the good, just as one may have found it
puzzling that Aristotle should have wanted to say that the
one approaching "is an accident of" Coriscus. But,
following my suggestion in Chapter III about the use of
cvsc' in these cases, just as
the one approaching is an accident of Coriscus
is true provided that (i)
Coriscus is the one approaching
is true, but (il) it is not the case that
Coriscus is the same as the one approaching
is true, so
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dent ofthe^oSd®
01"8 t0 aSk you about ls an acei-
is true if and only if (i)
the good is that which I am going to ask you about
is true, but (ii) it is not the case that
you a
g
bo°ut!
S the SamS 25 that Whl ° h 1 am ask
is true. 1
Again, I suspect, although Aristotle seems to want
to deny that the good is the same as (i.e. "is identical
with") that which I am going to ask you about, he would
allow that the good "is accidentally the same as" that which
I am going to ask you about. But there is no difficulty
with this. For, as has been urged previously.
The good is accidentally the same as that which I amgoing to ask you about
does not imply
The good is the same as (i.e. "=") that which I amgoing to ask you about.
In fact, as I interpret the notion of "accidental sameness,"
the former implies the denial of the latter. 2
Thus it seems to me that Aristotle's solution to
the paradox presently under discussion has the same inter-
esting features that were found in his solution to the
Coriscus Puzzle. First, Aristotle proposes that
Chapter III, p. 7 6.
^Chapter IV, pp. 103-104.
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The good Is that which I am going to ask you about
should be understood
,
not (as an unwary respondent might
assume) as an identity claim, but as
dpnt
1 arT\ soinS t0 ask you about is an acci-e of the good.
And then he rejects the principle that he thinks would be
required to justify the crucial inference in light of this
last revision—viz. the principle of accidence. Again in
this way, the paradox is resolved, and the indiscernibility
of identicals is preserved.
The Diversity Paradoxes
Some Unsat is t actorv Solutions
. As mentioned earlier,
Aristotle’s first examples of arguments that commit the
fallacy of accidence are to be found at SE l66b33f. I have
called these two arguments "the diversity paradoxes." In
what follows, I shall present what I take to be Aristotle’s
way of dealing with these paradoxes. However, before
undertaking that, let us consider how the indiscernibility
interpretation and the substitut ivity interpretation fare
with respect to these examples.
It will be recalled that, according to the indis-
cernibility interpretation, Aristotle’s solution to the
Coriscus Puzzle consists in giving up the principle, Ind.
Id. And since it is Aristotle's view that all paradoxes
of accidence can and ought to be solved in the same way.
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the question arises as to how the rejection of Ind. Id
might be thought to solve the diversity paradoxes.
For ray purposes here, it will be sufficient to
concentrate on the first diversity paradox.
( 1 )
( 2 )
.*. ( 3 )
Coriscus is other than (some) manCoriscus is (a) man
Coriscus is other than Coriscus.
At first glance, it is not at all clear how one might take
Ind. Id. to be the principle that justifies the inference
from (1) and (2) and (3). But perhaps the view is this.
First, let us take otherness-relative-to-Coriscus to be
the attribute in question. Then we can say that this
attribute is, in (1) said to belong to man, while, in (3),
it is said to belong to Coriscus. Second, suppose we read
(2) as the identity statement
(2)’ Coriscus = (a) man
In that case, the argument might go, since Coriscus is
identical with (a) man, and (a) man has the attribute
otherness-relative-to-Coriscus, it follows by Ind. Id. that
Coriscus has that attribute too.
But how reasonable is such a suggestion? Surely it
Is quite implausible to read (2) as (2)’. Hence, since the
indiscernibility interpretation requires this, that inter-
pretation seems, on those grounds alone, to be suspect. In
fact, once one realizes that—as I maintained in Chapter III
Aristotle’s discussion of the fallacy of accidence is in-
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tended precisely to warn against the
• confusion of accidence
and identity, it is especially difficult to envisage him
proposing such an account.
3
Does the substitutivitv interpretation fare any
better? Plainly it does not. For, again, we should have
to read (2) as (2)’, since the principle held to Justify
the inference from (1) and (2) to (3) will be something
like
If an identity
is the same as
1
...
1 and
salva veritate
statement '
. . .
=
» ( or t
1
^ true, then the two expressions
are interchangeable (everywhere),
Thus the subst itutivity interpretation, when applied to the
first diversity paradox, seems unsatisfactory for just the
same reason as the indiscernibility interpretation.
It is worth noting, however, that Peterson—who
defends the substitutivity interpretation of Aristotle's
solution to the Coriscus Puzzle—does deal at some length
with the diversity paradoxes.^ Moreover, she obviously
wants to avoid saddling Aristotle with the view that (2)
should be read as (2)'. On p. 119 she says (presenting
Aristotle's view), "Coriscus and man . . . are . . . not
one thing in number with one another, since man is a species
and Coriscus is not." But this raises a difficulty.
^Chapter III, p. 7^.
^S. L. Peterson, The Masker Paradox
,
(unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1969), p. 109ff.
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If Peterson's view is that Aristotle would not
have accepted (2)' as a correct reading of (2), then she
cannot hold that Aristotle takes the principle underlying
the inference from (1) and (2) to (3) to be the principle
of substitution that underlies the Coriscus Puzzle, for
that interpretation requires that (2) be read as (2)'.
And, in that case, she would appear to be committed to the
view that Aristotle's treatment of the diversity paradoxes
is different from his treatment of the Coriscus Puzzle.
Yet Aristotle purports to provide a single solution for all
paradoxes of accidence.
5
In short, then, it is not at all clear to me how
any of the foregoing interpretations might be thought to be
an adequate account of Aristotle's solution to the di-
versity paradoxes. So let me now try to apply my own in-
terpretation
.
The First Diversity Paradox
. On my view, the falla-
cious principle that Aristotle takes to be operative in
each of the paradoxes of accidence is neither Ind. Id. nor
Peterson’s substitution principle. It is, rather, the
principle of accidence. Thus the task to which I shall
address myself is to show how that principle might have
been thought by Aristotle to be at work in the diversity
paradoxes
.
5Pe Sophisticis Elenchis 179a26-27.
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Consider, again, the first diversity paradox:
W Coriscus is other than (some) man.Kd) Coriscus is (a) man.
,.(3) Coriscus is other than Coriscus.
As with the Coriscus Puzzle, we must ask "What are we to
count as subject, accident, and attribute?"
I have suggested that, in his discussion of the
fallacy of accidence, Aristotle is concerned with—among
other things—the clarification of the "logical form"
of sentences which may appear to be identity statements,
but which in iact, are not. The only plausible candidate
for such a sentence in the first diversity paradox is, of
course, (2). So, taking my earlier remarks on the Coriscus
Puzzle as a guide, we should expect Aristotle to be pointing
out that
(2) Coriscus is (a) man
is not to be understood as
Coriscus = (a) man,
but, rather, as
Man is an accident of Coriscus
(Although Coriscus is (a) man, to be (a) man is simply not
the same as to be Coriscus.) If this is correct, then the
accident in question seems to be whatever is designated
by ’man’; and the subject of which It is said to be an
accident is Coriscus.
6
6lt should be noted that, in presenting what I take
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In an earlier chapter, I remarked on the fact that
it seems odd, perhaps, that
-man' should be taken to desig-
nate an accident of Coriscus.? But again the point is, of
course, that all that seems to be intended by such a use
of ’accident ’ is that although
-man’ may be predicated of,
e.g.,
' Coriscus
' ,
it is not the case that ’Coriscus is the
same as ( = ) man-. For although
-man- does (on Aristotle's
view) designate Coriscus, he is not the only individual it
designates. In other words, whereas whatever is desig-
nated by 'Coriscus 7 is designated, also, by ’man', it is
not the case that whatever is designated by
-man’ is desig-
nated by 'Coriscus*. Or, as Aristotle puts it in Topics
109al0-ll
,
. . . conversion (to ^vTc.o'Tyo ) [in-
volving] the name of an accident is very risky."
Coriscus is (a) man
may be true; but it does not follow from this that
to be Aristotle’s solution to the diversity paradoxes Idisregard the quantifiers (’some 5
,
’each and every') and theindefinite article, ’a 5 . These were inserted in my recon-
structions of the arguments to yield somewhat more natural
English
,
and to indicate, more precisely, why those argu-
ments might have seemed worriesome to Aristotle and his
contemporaries. It is important to note, however, that
Aristotle, himself, does not attempt to "sharpen up" the
arguments in this way . His solution proceeds independently
of such complications as might be introduced by the in-
sertion of quantifiers etc. Just as 'Coriscus is (a)
man’ says simply, on his view, that man is an accident of
Coriscus, so ’Coriscus is other than (some) man’ says
simply that man has a certain attribute ((being) other than
Coriscus )
.
^Chapter III, 67ff.
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Man is Coriscus
is true too (as It should, of course. If the former were
an identity statement).
8
But given that the subject and accident are as
suggested
,
what is the attribute in question? The only
remaining term in the argument is 'other’ (
' cxzpov ' )
.
Of course it will not do to say that it is simply "other-
ness" that is said to belong to the accident or subject.
That would make no sense. For "otherness" is a relation
that can belong only to a pair of individuals taken to-
gether, not an attribute that may belong to just one.
So, as suggested in the previous section, what we should
say, perhaps, is that in, e.g.,
(1) Coriscus is other than (some) man,
what is said to belong to man is the attribute "otherness-
relative-to-Coriscus .
"
If we do adopt this suggestion, then we are in a
position to see how Aristotle might have come to think of
PA as the principle that licenses the inference in the first
diversity paradox. For, given that otherness-relative-to-
Coriscus belongs to man, and that man is an accident of
Coriscus, PA allows us to infer that otherness-relative-to
Coriscus, belongs to Coriscus.
^See also C. L. Hamblin, Fallacies (London:
Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1970), p. 85 .
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Supposing that these remarks are correct, then, it
is perhaps not so surprising that Aristotle should have
wanted to say that the fallacy underlying the first di-
versity paradox is precisely the one that underlies the
Coriscus Puzzle. The latter contains an inference that may
appear (or at least may have so appeared to some of
Aristotle 1 s contemporaries) to be licensed by the legiti-
mate principle of the indiscernibility of identicals.
Yet—Aristotle’s story might be thought to go—once one is
brought to realize that the crucial inference in the
Coriscus Puzzle is similar in form to the crucial infer-
ence in the first diversity paradox, and that the latter,
plainly, is not legitimized by the indiscernibility of
identicals, one may then be in a position to disabuse one-
self of the mistaken assumption that the Coriscus Puzzle
itself depends on Ind. Id.
The Second Diversity Paradox
. Since there is con-
siderable resemblance between the first diversity paradox
and the second, we can gain considerable advantage in our
consideration of the latter from what has been said already
about the former. The second diversity paradox, it will be
recalled, is open to two readings. The first is this:
(1) Man is other than Socrates.
(2) Socrates is (a) man.
(3) Man is other than man.
It is not difficult to see how the inference from (1) and
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(2) to (3) in this argument might have been thought to
depend upon PA. If we suppose that 'Socrates’ designates
the subject, 'man' the accident, and 'Man (is) other than’
the attribute, then what is inferred is that the attribute,
otherness-relative-zo-man
,
which belongs to the subject,
Socrates, belongs also to the accident, man. And this in-
ference is legitimized by PA.
The second reading of the second diversity para-
dox
—viz
.
(4) Coriscus is other than Socrates.
(5) Socrates is (a) man.
.*.(6) Coriscus is other than (each and every) man.
is no more difficult to deal with. Let Socrates be the
subject, man the accident, and otherness-relative-to-
Coriscus the attribute. Then, since otherness-relative-to-
Coriscus belongs to Socrates and man is an accident of
Socrates, we can say that wrhat is inferred—and expressed
by (6)— is that otherness-relative-to-Coriscus belongs to
man. 9 And again, it is PA that is held to justify this
inference
.
It seems to me, then, that on either reading of the
^Notice, again, that although the conclusion of the
second reading of the second diversity paradox requires
something like the insertion of the quantifier ’each and
every' to bring out its absurdity, Aristotle does not concern
himself with this. What is of importance to him is just that
’o Kopto-Kos srepov c*v£p ojrrou ' says that man has the attri-
bute, (being) other than Coriscus.
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second diversity paradox there is an inference that might
have been thought by Aristotle to depend upon PA. Hence,
as with the first diversity paradox it is understandable
that he should have taken that sophism to be a paradox of
accidence
.
* * *
Before leaving the diversity paradoxes, there is a
further observation that I wish to make. On both versions
of the second diversity paradox, there is an inference
from information about a certain subject’s having a given
attribute to the conclusion that an accident of that sub-
ject has it as well. On the other hand, if Aristotle con-
ceived of the first diversity paradox in the way described,
we have an inference from the information that a certain
accident has a particular attribute to the conclusion that
the subject of that accident has it also. This, I suggest,
supports my earlier claim that the principle of accidence
is not simply—despite the oversight in SE ch. 24—the
conditional^ 0
If x is a subject, and y is an accident of x, then
(z)(z belongs to x if z belongs to y).
Paradoxes of accidence sometimes, instead, make use of the
principle
If x is a subject, and y is an accident of x, then
•^Recall my discussion in Chapter III, 55PP*
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(z)(z belongs to y if z belongs to x).
Thus the principle of accidence seems to be more accurately
represented as
If x is a subject, and y is an accident of x, then(z)(z belongs to x if and only if z belongs to y).’
The Possessive Paradoxes
An__ M Obvious"' Interpretation
. As noted in Chapter
II, there are three paradoxes of accidence stated by Aris-
totle that seem to be of the form
x is your (my) own
x is (a) G
/.x is your (my) own G
For convenience, in the following discussion I shall ad-
dress most of my remarks to just one of these paradoxes
(call it "PI”)
:
(1) The dog is your own
(2) The dog is a father
.*.(3) The dog is your own father
Peterson has remarked that, although arguments of
this form may be such that no-one would be inclined to
accept them as valid, they are nevertheless of considerable
interest insofar as it is not clear just what that form is:
In case the reader thinks that no one would be tempted
to suppose the original argument valid anyway, he might
try the exercise of representing it in some quantifi-
cation theory. A rather natural representation, which
cannot be correct, is:
Yd
Fd
Fd. Yd
with ’Y', T F’, T d T and taking the obvious roles.
The representation cannot be correct, because it is a
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valid argument and the original was not. So therepresentation does not exhibit the logical form ofthe possessive paradox. It may of course be said thathave represented instead the argument:This dog is yours
This do g is a father
yours and this dog Is a fatherhich is valid (Aristotle notes that an analogousargument about a slave of yours which is a child would
thnu^
ld
->
in Cha
P? er xxiv of S°Ph - El.). There is still,ough, die proDlem of how to reoresent the false con-
thPo™
n This dog is your father' in quantificationeory We should not like just to pick a whole newindissoluble predicate, say 'G', and write it 'Gd'.The resultant argument:
Fd
Yd
Gd
would indeed not be valid, and in that respect it would
reproduce a logically important feature of the original
argument
; but the conclusion 'Gd' would lack the logi-
cally important feature of the original conclusion 'Thisdog is your father' of entailing—at least so one natu-
rally supposes— that this deg is a father. 1 !
Peterson, however, does not discuss these matters further.
Nor, unfortunately, does she make any suggestions about why
Aristotle might have seen fit to classify the possessive
paradoxes as paradoxes of accidence.
I share Peterson’s view that the possessive para-
doxes are of considerable interest. In fact, they seem, at
least at first glance, to bear some resemblance to fal-
lacious arguments such as
This elephant is small
This elephant is an animal
.-.This elephant is a small animal.
And although, to my knowledge, no-one in recent times has
taken up the specific problem of analysing sentences con-
11Peterson, op . cit
.
, pp. 162-163 In. 16.
14 Q
taining possessive adjectives (’your', ’my' etc.), there
have been efforts to analyse sentences containing adjec-
tives such as 'small'— i.e. adjectives that Parsons has
called non-predicative 1 adjectives
. But my concern,
here, is specifically with Aristotle and possessive
adjectives. So let me turn, now, to the task of trying
to show how he--Aristot le—may have come to think of the
possessive paradoxes as sophisms that commit the fallacy
of accidence.
At first glance, it seems that there is pernaps a
rather obvious way of showing how the argument, PI, might
have been thought to turn on the fallacious principle of
accidence. Taking 'the dog' to designate the subject,
’father’ to designate the accident, and 'your own’ to
designate the attribute, (1) tells us that your own is an
1 ?
T. Parsons, "Some Problems Concerning the Logic
of Grammatical Modifiers," in Semantics of Natural Language
,
ed. Davidson and Harman, (Reidel, 1972), pp . 127-142. 'Small',
according to Parsons, qualifies as a "non-predicative”
adjective in virtue of the fact that sentences of the form
x is a small P
are not analysable as
x is small and x is an F
.
But Aristotle seems to have noticed that this feature be-
longs also to possessive adjectives such as 'crov' ('your
own’). At least, he makes it clear that he thinks that
x is your own and x is an F
does not imply
x is your own F. (SE l80a5-8).
For further discussions relevant to "non-predicative"
adjectives, see also H. Reichenbach, Elements of Symbolic
Logic (Free Press, 1966), esp. Section 53; J. Wallace,
"Positive
,
Comparative, Superlative," The Journal of Philo-
sophy
,
LXIX
,
No. 21 (1972), pp. 773-732.
1M
attribute of the dog, (2) tells us that father is an
accident of the dog, and (3), we might say, tells us that
your own belongs to father. And the inference from (1)
and (2) to (3) is, in that case, one that would be licensed
by the principle of accidence.
It seems plausible to hold that ’father' desig-
nates an accident of the subject, this dog. But while it
may appear appropriate to say that the attribute, your own,
belongs to the dog, it is not so clear what it could mean
to say—as we would have Aristotle doing on the view just
outlined—that your own is an attribute of father. In
fact, what this seems to suggest is that the dog’s acci-
dent, father, is to be counted among ”your !t possessions.
And surely this is absurd.
Hamblin's Version of the "Is the Dog your Father
?
: '
There is, however, one suggestion that I know of that seems
to alleviate this last difficulty. C. L. Hamblin proposes,
at one point, that perhaps the way Aristotle conceives of
the "Is the dog your father?" paradox is simply as follows:
(i) The dog is yours.
(ii) The dog is a father.
(iii) The father is yours. 13
If we adopt this reformulation, then we no longer have to
13c. L. Hamblin, Fallacies
,
p. 86. "... the
source of invalidity of the quasi-syllogism 'The dog is
yours: the dog is a father; therefore, the father is yours'
could be traced to the non-convertibility of 'The dog is a
father', in virtue of the fact that not all fathers are
this dog."
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say that yours (or, your own) is said to belong to father.
Rather, it is—as is made clear in (iii)—said to belong
to a particular father—the one which the dog is.
Yet, although Hamblin's proposal has the advant-
age of alleviating one difficulty, it seems to raise at
least one other. Briefly, it seems to me that it might
be argued that Hamblin's formulation of the argument is,
unlike the original version, non-paradoxical
. For pre-
sumably (i) is elliptical for something like,
(i)' The dog is your property
In view of this, it might be urged that 'yours', in (i),
designates the attribute cf (being) your property (or,
perhaps, "belonging to you"). And since Aristotle thinks
that, in the conclusions of the argument, the same attri-
bute that is ascribed to one thing in (i) is ascribed to
something else, (iii) would have to be taken by him to
be elliptical for
(iii)' The father (i.e. the dog in question, which
happens to be a father) is your property.
But (iii)', unlike the conclusion of PI—i.e.,
(3) The dog is your own father
—seems to be true
,
Interestingly enough, as suggested earlier, in
Chapter II, Aristotle himself says something at SE l80a5ff.
that seems rather like the point that I have just been
trying to make. The text, again, is this:
oyO LcttC toufo o-ov Vex c. eo-ct de touto teKVoV
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. C Ve* C. K of 0*0 v
friv Sp« r==To t£kvov. Str t eruu,¥„KCVrtxvov
;
c^/\A 7 o<j crov rtKvoy,
(Is this year own? Yes. And is this a child’ Thenyonr own [is] this child; because it happens to be
chi^d)
our own and a child
> but “ ls not your own
Here, I take the sugeestion to be that, although, from the
premisses
Tnis is your own
and
This is a child,
we cannot conclude
-his is your own child ([tooto ] crov xckvov )
we can, nevertheless, conclude
Your own is this child,
or, more naturally,
This child is your own ( crov . , . toot o -t£xvov).
Thus, I suspect that Aristotle would want to say—in para-
llel fashion--that
,
although the premisses
The dog is your own
and
The dog is a father
do not imply
The dog is your own father,
they do imply
The father (i.e. the dog) is your own.
And so, presumably, since he plainly thinks that the "Is
the dog your father?" involves an inference to an absurd
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concxusion, Aristotle would find Hamblin's version un-
satisfactory
.
The situation, then, seems to be this. On the one
hand, a move such as Hamblin’s (i.e. which simply involves
changing the subject of (3) and predicating 'your own'
(by itself) of that subject) appears to be unacceptable
both in its own right, and from Aristotle's point of view.
It is important, in any reconstruction of the paradox, to
preserve the fact that, while 'your own' in (1) is ellipti-
cal for something like 'your own property', in (3) 'your
own' is (explicitly) concatenated with 'father' (and hence
is not elliptical for 'your own property'). Yet, on the
other hand, the "obvious" interpretation, that Aristotle
thinks of ’your own' as designating something that can be
thought of as an attribute of something like the accident,
father, is hard to make sense of. Consequently, what seems
to be called for— if we are to make plausible the view
that the possessive paradoxes depend on the principle of
accidence--is a somewhat "less obvious" interpretation.
A "Less Obvious" Interpretation . Before proceeding
further, I should like to emphasize a point that was raised
In the previous section. There I suggested that
(1) The dog is your own
might reasonably be taken to be elliptical for something
like
1*45
(1) The dog is your own property
Moreover, there is some evidence that Aristotle recognizes
this. For example, in presenting the "Is the statue my
own work?
" paradox, he says
Ncr if this Is mine, and this is a work, is it nv
In other words, if this is mine, then, although it is not
my work, it is_ my " such-and-such
.
"
Let us, then, reconsider the "Is the dog your
father?" making the first premiss more explicit: i.e.
(1)
' The dog is your own property
(2) The dog is a father
/.(3) The dog is your own father!5
Does this revision suggest any further possibilities for
the analysis of the argument?
It is worth noting, I think, that both ’property'
and ’father’ are "relational predicates." 16 Moreover
^De Sophisticis Elenchis 179b4-6. The emphasis is
mine
.
I5lt should be noted that in making the premiss
This dog is your own’ more explicit, I have avoided simply
filling it out as ’This dog is your own dog'. There is rea-
son to think that Aristotle would not, strictly speaking,
regard 'dog' as an appropriate filler. here. For/ at Cate-
gories 8a22f f
. ,
Aristotle says, "... a man is not called
someone’s man nor an ox someone's ox nor a log someone's log
(but it is called someone's property)." (Ackrill’s transla-
tion)
.
l6
"In [Chapter 7 of the Categories
,
Aristotle] does
not, for the most part, treat of relations (similarity,
slavery) but rather, in effect, of relational predicates
('similar', 'slave')." Aristotle’s Categories and De
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according to the Cat egories
,
both 'The dog as designated
by property*
’ and *The dog as designated by 'father'*
are good examples of designators of what Aristotle calls
relatives
.
nl 7 Keeping this last point in mind, it seems
to me that it might have been fairly natural for Aristotle
to understand
(1)' The dog is your own property
and
(3) The dog is your own father
as saying something about, not the dog, but, rather, the
dog as designated by 'property' and the dog as designated
by 'father', respectively.
But what might, e.g.,
(1)' The dog is your own property
be taken to be saying about the dog as designated by 'pro-
perty'? It seems not quite right to say that (1)' says of
that "relative" simply that it has the attribute, (being)
your own. For, as mentioned above, 'your own' is ellip-
tical. Nor will it do to say that what is being attributed
Is (being) your own property. For then the resultant
Interpretatione
,
translated with notes by J. L. Ackrill,
p~ 9o . Both father' and 'property' are given as examples
in Categories ch. 7.
17"A "relative" is for [Aristotle] neither a rela-
tive term nor a person or thing designated by a relative
term, but rather a person or thing as designated by some
relative term." Aristotle's Categories
,
(unpublished
translation with notes by S. Marc Cohen and Gareth B.
Matthews), note ft 23.
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argument would run into the same difficulty as Hamblin's
reconstruction . 18
There is, however, a further possibility that
seems to me to be worth considering. In his opening re-
mark on "relatives," Aristotle says.
The things that are called relatives are those which
ar e said to be just wrhat they are either of (or than or
t£) other things or, in some other way
,
iiTrelatlorT'to
another. 1 ^
In other words, a given relative may be said to have the
attribute of being something that is said to be just what
it is relative to something else. Thus, for example, if
we take the dog as designated by 'property' to be a rela-
tive, we might say that it has the attribute of being
something that is said to be just what it is relative to
something-or-other. And, if the dog is your property then
the "something-or-other" is you . To put the point con-
cisely, it seems to me that Aristotle might have found it
natural to understand
l^That is, if 'The dog is your own property' were
construed as ascribing to the dog as designated by 'pro-
perty’ the attribute of being your own property, then the
conclusion of the sophism— 'The dog is your father' would
have to be taken as
The dog as designated by 'father' is your own property.
(The same attribute that is ascribed in the premiss must,
if the inference proceeds by PA, be ascribed in the con-
clusion). And, as with the conclusion of Hamblin's ver-
sion, this seems not to be absurd in the way that
The dog is your own father
is
.
^categories
,
6a36f. (tr. Cohen and Matthews).
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(1) The dog is your own property
as saying something like
(1)" The d°S as designated by ’property' is some-
thing that is said to be just what it is rela-tive to (i.e. of) you.
And, in similar fashion,
(3) The dog is your own father
might have been construed as saying comething like
(3)' The dog as designated by ’father' is something
that is said to be just what it is relative to
(i.e. of) you.
Let us suppose, then, that (1)" and (3)' are
satisfactory "Aristotelian readings" of (1)' and (3),
respectively. In that case, it seems that an attribute
that, in (1)', is said to belong to the dog as designated
by ’property’ is said, in (3), to belong to the dog as
designated by ’father’ —viz. the attribute designated by
'(is) something that is said to be just what it is relative
to (i.e. of) you'. Thus, if the dog as designated by 'pro-
perty' were taken to be a subject, and the dog as desig-
nated by ’father' as an accident of that subject, or vice
versa, the principle of accidence, on the basis of this
Information, would be sufficient to license the inference
from (1) ’ ' to (3)
'
20of course, to treat, e.g., the dog as designated
by 'property' as subject, and the dog as designated by
'father’ as accident, is to ascribe to Aristotle (at least
on my interpretation) the view that although
The dog as designated by 'property' is the dog as
designated by 'father'
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In otner words, if the argument were construed as
( 1 )”
( 2 ) ’
/. ( 3 )
'
The dog as designated by ’propertything that is said to be just what
tive to you.
The dog as designated by ’father’
dent of the dog as designated by '(or vice versa)
’ is some-
it is rela-
is an acci-
property
'
The dog as designated by ’father’ is something
that is said to be just what it is relative toyou.
then it would appear reasonable to suppose that it committed
the fallacy of accidence.
Perhaps, however, there is no need even to assume
that one of the two relatives—the dog as designated by
'property', and the dog as designated by
' father ' —must
be regarded as the subject, and the other as the accident.
Perhaps we can simply treat both as accidents—accidents
,
that is, of the subject, the dog . 21 This, I must admit,
seems more appropriate. Of course, what we have, in that
is true, it is not the case that
The dog as designated by 'property' = the dog as desig-
nated by ’father’
is true.
21Again, of course, to treat each of these relatives
as an accident of the dog is to say (i) that although
The dog is the dog as designated by ’property'
is true.
The dog = the dog as designated by ’property’
is not; and (ii) that although
The dog is the dog as designated by 'father'
is true,
The dog = the dog as designated by ’father’
is not. (The being ('Co c(voa) of the dog is neither the
same as the being of the dog as designated by 'property ' nor
the same as the being of the dog as designated by 'father 1
.
)
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case, is an inference from information that an accident of
a given subject has a certain attribute, to the conclusion
that another accident of the same subject has that attri-
bute. But brief reflection on the principle of accidence
shows that that principle (i.e. PA) in fact implies that
whatever attributes any accident of a given subject has,
belong also to that subject’s other accidents.^ So,
even if we allow that both the dog as designated by ’pro-
perty’
,
and the dog as designated by 'father' are accidents
of the dog, the "Is the dog your father?" is still appropri-
ately classifiable as a paradox that arises from the ac-
ceptance of the principle of accidence.
The "Is the statue my work?" and the "Is this your
child?" present no new difficulties. In the former, on
the interpretation just given, there is an inference from
the information that a certain accident of the statue—viz.
the statue as designated by 'possession'—has the attri-
bute, (being) something that is said to be just what it is
relative to (i.e. of) me, and that the statue as designated
by 'work' is an accident of the statue, to the conclusion
that the statue as designated by 'work' has the attribute
2
^To illustrate, let a and b be any two accidents
of a given subject, s_, and let F-ness be an attribute of a.
We can show, then, that PA allows us to infer that F-ness
is also an attribute of b:
(1) F-ness belongs to a (Premiss
)
(2) a is an accident of s_ ( Premiss
.*.(3) F-ness belongs to s (1) (2) PA
(4) b is an accident of s (Premiss
.‘.(5) F-ness belongs to b (3) (4) PA
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of (being) something that is said to be just what it is
relative to (i.e. of) me. And in the "Is this your child?"
the inference can be said to proceed from the information
that this (individual) as designated by 'slave'—an acci-
dent of this (individual)—has the attribute, (being)
something that is said to be just what it is relative to
(i.e. Ox) you, and that this (individual) as designated by
'child' is an accident of this (individual), to the con-
clusion that this (individual) as designated by 'child' has
the attribute, (being) something that is said to be just
what it is relative to you.
Of course, nowhere in his discussion of the pos-
sessive paradoxes does Aristotle lay things out in just
this way. In fact, he gives us virtually no clues at all
about how these particular examples might be thought to
fit the pattern of paradoxes of accidence. Moreover, the
"surface structure" of the possessive paradoxes suggests,
as I have tried to indicate, no obvious way of showing how
they might have been thought to fit the mold. Yet it seems
to me that the interpretation just proposed does, neverthe-
less, provide a possibility that is at least consonant with,
if not supported by, other things that Aristotle says, and
hence is an account worth considering.
The "Is a Few Taken a Few Times a Few?"
Poste's Version. The last of the examples of para-
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doxes of accidence listed in Chapter II is the "Is a few
taken a few times a few?" Although, with respect to most
of the paradoxes of accidence, Aristotle gives us at least
some indication of how they go, no such clues are provided
for this example. But again, of course, it is reasonable
to assume that uhe pattern established for the other para-
doxes may be used as a guide. Specifically, this involves
looking for a reconstruction on which the paradox can be
shown to turn on the principle of accidence. Let us con-
sider, first, the reconstructions proposed by Poste and
Joseph
.
Poste' s reconstruction is this:
(1) A four multiplied by a four is a large number
(2) A four multiplied by a four is a four
.’.(3) A four is a large number2
3
At first glance, it may appear chat this formulation does
yield an inference-pattern that is licensed by PA. Taking
'A four' to designate the subject, and, 'A four multiplied
by a four' to designate the accident, it might be suggested
that the attribute, (being a) large number, is inferred to
belong to the former cn the grounds that it belongs to the
latter
But, as Poste himself points out, there are actually
four terms in this reconstruction. For 'A four multiplied
by a four' in (2) "means the first-named factor," whereas
23e. Poste, Aristotle on Fal laci es of the Sophistici
Elenchi (London: MacMillan and Co., l’3"56), p. 73~.
_
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in (1) it "means the product of the factors. "2 4 So
,
in-
stead of being an inference that could be said to depend
on PA, and, hence, to commit the fallacy of accidence,
the argument that Poste has offered seems, rather, to be
an instance of as Foste in fact admits— "equivocation."
Or, perhaps, had Aristotle conceived of the argu-
ment in Poste* s way, he may have even classified it as a
fallacy of "combination" (rr^^ cruvOrjcriv)
. For the
inference from (1) and (2) to (3) is valid provided that
’A four multiplied by a four* is treated the same in both
sentences in which it occurs. It is in the shift from
A four (multiplied by a four) is a four
to
(A four multiplied by a four) is a four
that the fallacy is committed. And this might be thought
to fall in the same class as inferences from, e.g.,
I saw a man being beaten (with my eyes)
to
I saw a man (being beaten with my eyes). 2 ^
But, whatever the case, on Poste *s reconstruction,
the paradox in question seems to be, clearly, not a para-
dos of accidence.
Joseph's Version . Joseph's reconstruction of the
2 Ibid . • pp. 156-157
2
^For discussion of the fallacy of "combination"
see De Sophist lei s E lenchls XX.
154
Is a ffcw taken a few times a few?" seems to me to run
into difficulties similar to Poste’s. Joseph suggests that
the argument goes like this:
(4) Six is a few
(5) Thirty-six is six times six.
.‘.(6) Thirty-six is a few. 26
But why should this argument be thought to qualify as a
sophism rr«:yo«
-c6 cro^j3 zp, TjKo^
.
Joseph does say that "six times six" is "an acci-
dental way of regarding thirty-six things." So perhaps
his view is that ’six times six' designates an accident
of thirty-six (or maybe "designates thirty-six accidental-
ly"). In that case, it would seem reasonable to suppose
that he takes ’thirty-six' to designate the subject. And,
finally, we might suppose that the attribute is what is
designated by ’(is a) few'.
Yet there is a problem here in that the first
premiss is simply
(4) Six is a few.
In other words, (being a) few seems to be attributed to
something simply designated by 'six’. Thus, we have a
fourth term again.
But perhaps the argument that Joseph has in mind
is, more explicitly,
(7) Six times six is a few
w. B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic
(Oxford, 1916), p. 587-
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(8) Thirty-six is six times six
.*.(9) Thirty-six is a few.
And then it at least appears that we have the appropriate
three terms, as we are supposed to—viz. ’six times six',
thirty-six’, and ’(is) a few'. But is this in fact the
case?
Presumably (8), if true, means something like
(8)' Thirty-six is the product of the factors, six
and six.
That is, 'six times six'—in (8)—designates the number
thirty-six. Yet in,
(7) Six times six is a few,
'six times six' does not designate thirty-six (for it is
assumed to be false that thirty-six is a few). Rather, it
designates (as Poste would put it) "the first-named
factor"—i.e. six.
In short, on Joseph's reconstruction, if the two
premisses are to be true, then 'six times six' must be
taken to designate different entities in each premiss.
And, in that case, it seems that the inference involved is
not one that could be licensed by the principle of acci-
dence. The fallacy lies, instead, as Poste thinks, in
equivocation.
A More Plausible Version . I take the equivocation
involved in each of the previous reconstructions to be
sufficient to rule them out as adequate versions of the
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argument referred to as the "Is a few taken a few times a
few?" Let me now suggest a version that not only does not
suffer from this defect, but also seems to be such that it
is plausible to suppose that it might have been thought to
depend upon the principle of accidence.
It will be recalled that the sophist's aim is to
draw the respondent into admitting a contradiction, or at
least an absurdity of some sort. Thus, when he asks "Do
you know the one approaching?" the unwary respondent says
"No." The sophist goes on, however, to provide an argu-
ment intended to show that the respondent does know the one
approaching. The "Is a few taken a few times a few?"
involves, I suspect, a similar procedure. The sophist asks
"Is a few taken a few times a few?" And the respondent
replies "No"
—
presumably aware that, e.g. eight (a few)
multiplied by itself is not a few. (Or perhaps the res-
pondent is aware of the even more interesting fact that a
consequence of allowing that a few taken a few times is a
few is that every number, in that case, turns out to be a
few.) Having secured the respondent's denial, however, the
sophist proceeds to provide an argument to show that "a few
taken a few times is_ a few." And that argument, I suggest,
goes like this:
(1) Four is (a) few.
(2) Four is (a) few (taken a) few times
.\(3) (A) few (taken a) few times is (a) few.
On this reconstruction of the argument, (being a)
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Tew Is said, in (1), to belong to the number designated
by ’Four 1
. In (3), however, it is concluded that the same
attribute belongs to whatever is designated by ’(A) few
(taken a) few times’. I suggest, therefore, that we might
take '(is a) few’ to designate the attribute, ’four' to
designate the subject, and ’(a) few (taken a) few times’ to
designate the accident of that subject. Then we can say
that the inference is one that proceeds from the informa-
tion that a certain subject, four, has the attribute, (be-
ing a) few, and that a few taken a few times is an accident
of four, to the conclusion that that accident also has the
attribute, (being a) few. And this inference is one that
would be licensed by the principle of accidence. 2 ?
Again, then, there would appear to be a way of
extending Aristotle’s solution to the Coriscus Puzzle to
the sophism presently under consideration. First, on my
interpretation, we should take him to be concerned to point
out that, although four is a few taken a few times, it is
not the case that four is the same as ( = ) a few taken a
P7Notice again, however, that—as in the diversity
paradoxes—although we should perhaps want to "sharpen up"
the argument (by inserting appropriate quantifiers, etc.)
before dealing with it, Aristotle here disregards such matters.
That is, although we might think it important to point out that
(3) (A) few (taken a) few times is (a) few
is false only if understood as
(3)' (Every) few (taken a) few times is (a) few,
what Aristotle seems to regard as important is simply that
(3) expresses that the accident, few (taken a) few times
,
has
a certain attribute—viz. (being) a few.
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xew times. To be four is not the same as to be a few
taken a few times. Hence, a few taken a few times is simply
an accident of four. Second, once the second premiss is
correctly understood, it becomes clear that the inference
from (1) and (2) to (3) depends upon the principle of
accidence--a principle that can be (and ought to be)
rejected, without giving up the indiscernibility of identi-
cals
.
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